Florida State University Law Review
Volume 35

Issue 1

2007

Emotional Paternalism
Jeremy A. Blumenthal
0@0.com

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Emotional Paternalism, 35 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. (2007) .
https://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr/vol35/iss1/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Florida State University Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship Repository. For more
information, please contact efarrell@law.fsu.edu.

Article 1

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY
LAW REVIEW

EMOTIONAL PATERNALISM
Jeremy A. Blumenthal

VOLUME 35

FALL 2007

NUMBER 1

Recommended citation: Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Emotional Paternalism, 35 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 1 (2007).

EMOTIONAL PATERNALISM
JEREMY A. BLUMENTHAL*
I.
II.

INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................
WHY PATERNALISM? ..........................................................................................
A. Defining Paternalism ...................................................................................
B. Justifying Paternalism.................................................................................
C. Literature on Social Science and Paternalism............................................
III. IMPLICATIONS OF COGNITIVE AND EMOTIONAL BIASES FOR PATERNALISTIC
INTERVENTION ...................................................................................................
A. Emotion and Cognition ................................................................................
B. Cognitive Biases and Implications for Paternalism ...................................
C. Emotional Biases and Implications for Paternalism..................................
1. Framework and Distinctions .................................................................
2. Types of Emotional Biases .....................................................................
(a) Biases Involving Judgments About Emotions................................
i) Affective Forecasting .................................................................
ii) The Endowment Effect ..............................................................
iii) Probability Neglect ....................................................................
(b) Biases Involving Immediate or Incidental Emotions.....................
i) Affect Infusion ...........................................................................
ii) Risk Perception..........................................................................
iii) Hot/Cold Empathy Gaps..........................................................
(c) Manipulation by Others ..................................................................
i) Securities Litigation..................................................................
ii) Decisionmaking About Abortion...............................................
iii) Susceptibility to Advertising.....................................................
iv) Contract Terms..........................................................................
IV. EVALUATING INTERVENTIONS ............................................................................
A. Questions.......................................................................................................
B. Effectiveness of Debiasing ............................................................................
1. Debiasing Through Self-Correction.......................................................
2. Debiasing Through Education ..............................................................
3. Debiasing Through Procedural Interventions ......................................
4. Debiasing Through Substantive Interventions .....................................
(a) Legislative Substitution ..................................................................
(b) Judicial Substitution.......................................................................
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION..............................................................................

2
6
6
10
14
18
18
24
27
27
30
31
31
33
35
37
37
40
42
44
45
45
47
49
50
50
51
51
54
60
62
63
66
70

* J.D., University of Pennsylvania Law School; A.B., A.M., Ph.D., Harvard University. Faculty workshops at Cornell Law School and Seton Hall School of Law elicited helpful comments and questions, as did presentations at the Behavioral and Experimental Law
and Economics conference in Haifa, Israel (June 2006) and the International Society for
Research on Emotions conference in Atlanta, Ga. (Aug. 2006). A number of people were
kind enough to discuss the paper with me and give feedback: Judy Bernstein, Peter
Blanck, Paul Brest, Stephen Burbank, Mark Denbeaux, Howie Erichson, Chris Guthrie,
Valerie Hans, Ed Hartnett, Michael Heise, Erik Lillquist, Jeffrey Rachlinski, and Charlie
Sullivan. I am grateful to Virginia Picciano and Carolyn Le for their research assistance.
Silvia Cardoso and Barclay Law Library staff all provided substantial support.

2

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:1

[I]t is the reason, alone, of the public, that ought to
control and regulate the government. The passions
[of the public] ought to be controlled and regulated
by the government.1
I. INTRODUCTION
At least two bodies of legal scholarship have recently challenged
the primacy of the traditional rational-actor, law and economics approach to law and policy.2 The first, taking a cognitive-psychological
or behavioral economics approach, focuses on mental heuristics and
biases that lead to departures from optimal or rational decisionmaking. This literature is voluminous and increasing.3 A second line of
legal scholarship focuses on the role of emotion in legal judgment and
decisionmaking, whether by judges, juries, bureaucrats, legislators,
or citizens. Although somewhat less developed than the first,4 this
1. THE FEDERALIST NO. 49 (James Madison) (emphasis added).
2. I use the term “recently” advisedly. Certainly, as discussed below, the second line
of research—incorporating empirical research on the emotions—has only begun to be fully
recognized. See Terry A. Maroney, Law and Emotion: A Proposed Taxonomy of an Emerging Field, 30 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 119 (2006). But scholars have noted the flawed axioms of
law and economics and pure rational choice models, albeit sporadically, over at least the
last five decades. See, e.g., JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES
(Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982); HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS OF MAN: SOCIAL AND
RATIONAL (1957); Ward Edwards, Behavioral Decision Theory, 12 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 473
(1961); Ward Edwards & Detlof von Winterfeldt, Cognitive Illusions and their Implications
for the Law, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 225 (1986). More generally, psychologists and other social
scientists have suggested that their research has useful application to the law since at
least the early 20th century. See Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Law and Social Science in the
Twenty-First Century, 12 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1, 7-13 (2002) (reviewing the early conversation between the disciplines of psychology and law). And perhaps “challenged” is too
weak a word. Both theoretical and empirical research in psychology and economics have
demonstrated the unrealistic premises of the traditional law and economics approach,
which assumes essentially rational, ideally unemotional actors who seek to maximize utility and welfare. Robert A. Prentice, Chicago Man, K-T Man, and the Future of Behavioral
Law and Economics, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1663, 1774 (2003) (“[T]he debate over whether the
economists’ Chicago Man or the psychologists’ K-T Man better describes reality is over; the
psychologists won.”).
3. For general overviews documenting the departures, see JUDGMENT UNDER
UNCERTAINTY, supra note 2; HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE
JUDGMENT (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002); RICHARD H. THALER, QUASI RATIONAL
ECONOMICS (1991). For general discussions of the application of this literature to the law
see, for example, BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000); Christine
Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998);
Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051 (2000); Donald C.
Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and Decision Making in Legal Scholarship:
A Literature Review, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1499 (1998); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The “New” Law
and Psychology: A Reply to Critics, Skeptics, and Cautious Supporters, 85 CORNELL L. REV.
739 (2000); Symposium, Empirical Legal Realism: A New Social Scientific Assessment of
Law and Human Behavior, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1075 (2003).
4. This is so for a number of reasons. First, as a general matter, emotions have long
been neglected in legal and economic discussions. Yuval Rottenstreich & Suzanne Shu, The
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line of writing, and the empirical social science research it often
seeks to incorporate, has likewise demonstrated departures from the
traditional conception of a rational decisionmaker. Substantial empirical evidence shows, for instance, that people make different
judgments and choices when in a good mood than when in a bad
mood.5 Emotion biases an individual’s perceptions of probability and
Connections Between Affect and Decision Making: Nine Resulting Phenomena, in
BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 444, 459 (Derek J. Koehler &
Nigel Harvey eds. 2004) (“One unfortunate consequence of the historical conservative bias
in decision-making research was neglect of affective phenomena.”); Jon Elster, Rationality
and the Emotions, 106 ECON. J. 1386, 1386 (1996) (“Emotions are a neglected topic, and
the neglect of economists is second to none.”). Recently, this “neglect” has been changing,
with increasing discussion in the legal literature of issues relating to emotion. See, e.g.,
THE PASSIONS OF LAW (Susan A. Bandes ed., 1999); Susan Bandes, Empathy, Narrative,
and Victim Impact Statements, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 361, 366-82 (1996); Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Law and the Emotions: The Problems of Affective Forecasting, 80 IND. L.J. 155 (2005)
[hereinafter Blumenthal, Affective Forecasting]; Ward Farnsworth, Do Parties to Nuisance
Cases Bargain After Judgment? A Glimpse Inside the Cathedral, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 373
(1999); Neal R. Feigenson, Sympathy and Legal Judgment: A Psychological Analysis, 65
TENN. L. REV. 1 (1997); Peter H. Huang, Reasons Within Passions: Emotions and Intentions in Property Rights Bargaining, 79 OR. L. REV. 435 (2000); Eric A. Posner, Law and
the Emotions, 89 GEO. L.J. 1977 (2001); Emotion in Legal Judgment and Decision Making,
30 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 115-248 (2006). See generally Blumenthal, supra
note 2, at 24-25 (noting the recent increase in legal attention to the emotions); Laura E.
Little, Negotiating the Tangle of Law and Emotion, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 974 (2001) (discussing the same); Maroney, supra note 2 (reviewing the increase in scholarship). Second,
there has been a tendency for legal discussion of emotions to focus on philosophical approaches; indeed, the best-known works on emotion in the law are those of philosophers.
See, e.g., JON ELSTER, ALCHEMIES OF THE MIND: RATIONALITY AND THE EMOTIONS (1999);
MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, UPHEAVALS OF THOUGHT: THE INTELLIGENCE OF EMOTIONS (2001)
[hereinafter NUSSBAUM, UPHEAVALS OF THOUGHT]; Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 269 (1996); Martha C. Nussbaum, “Secret Sewers of Vice”: Disgust, Bodies, and the Law, in THE PASSIONS
OF LAW, supra, at 19. To an extent, this has led to fewer efforts to incorporate empirical
work into legal discussions than might be expected. Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Does Mood Influence Moral Judgment? An Empirical Test with Legal and Policy Implications, 29 LAW &
PSYCHOL. REV. 1, 4 (2005) [hereinafter Blumenthal, Mood and Moral Judgment] (noting
that despite “interest in the potential for affect to influence ‘rational’ reasoning, legal
scholars and social scientists have conducted far less empirical research directly testing
such questions than might be expected”). Third, there is debate even among empirical social scientists about the nature and phenomenology of emotions, as well as about the processes by which emotion affects, influences, interacts with, controls, or is subject to, more
“rational” cognitive processes. See generally HANDBOOK OF AFFECTIVE SCIENCES (Richard
J. Davidson et al. eds., 2003); THE NATURE OF EMOTION: FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS (Paul
Ekman & Richard J. Davidson eds., 1994). Although the disagreement this debate has led
to can be overstated, it can nevertheless yield a misleading picture of the field as somewhat incoherent.
5. For reviews of the extensive empirical data on the influence of mood on social and
interpersonal judgments, see Gordon H. Bower, Mood Congruity of Social Judgments, in
EMOTION AND SOCIAL JUDGMENTS 31 (Joseph P. Forgas ed., 1991); Joseph P. Forgas, Mood
and Judgment: The Affect Infusion Model (AIM), 117 PSYCHOL. BULL. 39 (1995); Norbert
Schwarz, Feelings as Information: Informational and Motivational Functions of Affective
States, in 2 HANDBOOK OF MOTIVATION AND COGNITION: FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL
BEHAVIOR 527 (E. Tory Higgins & Richard M. Sorrentino eds., 1990); and see generally
FEELING AND THINKING: THE ROLE OF AFFECT IN SOCIAL COGNITION (Joseph P. Forgas ed.,
2000).
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risk.6 Similarly, contrary to the predictions of rational decisionmaking, when a judgment about the outcome of a particular action is accompanied by strong emotion, people’s decisions about those outcomes are relatively impervious to changes in their probability.7 And
people tend to inaccurately predict their own future emotional
states—as well as those of others—even when the predictions concern important self-relevant events or, in some cases, are even minutes in the future.8
Commentators reviewing the burgeoning literature in these two
lines of scholarship have begun to discuss its practical implications
for the law. Most recently, they have focused on what the research
might suggest for an increased third-party role to help protect individuals from their own biases.9 That is, the most recent discussion
has focused on the findings’ implications for the appropriateness and
scope of paternalistic policies.10
This paternalism discussion, however, has been incomplete in a
number of contexts. First, despite a substantial focus on the implications of the first line of scholarship (documenting cognitive biases),
commentators have addressed the implications of emotional biases
far less.11 Second, much (but by no means all) of the most recent discussion has been in the context of intervention by private parties,
6. See infra Part III.C.2.b.ii.
7. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Probability Neglect: Emotions, Worst Cases, and Law,
112 YALE L.J. 61 (2002).
8. Blumenthal, Affective Forecasting, supra note 4, at 166-73.
9. See, e.g., id. at 234-37; Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Case for “Asymmetric Paternalism,” 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211
(2003); Jolls et al., supra note 3; Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form
Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1206 (2003); Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski, Cognitive Errors, Individual Differences, and Paternalism, 73 U. CHI. L. REV.
207 (2006) [hereinafter Rachlinski, Cognitive Errors]; Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Uncertain
Psychological Case for Paternalism, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1165 (2003) [hereinafter Rachlinski,
Uncertain Psychological Case]; Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159 (2003). Responses to these proposals
are percolating. See, e.g., Edward L. Glaeser, Paternalism and Psychology, 73 U. CHI. L.
REV. 133 (2006) (responding in part to Sunstein and Thaler’s proposals); Jonathan Klick &
Gregory Mitchell, Government Regulation of Irrationality: Moral and Cognitive Hazards,
90 MINN. L. REV. 1620 (2006) (criticizing Sunstein and Thaler’s proposals); Gregory
Mitchell, Libertarian Paternalism Is an Oxymoron, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1245 (2005) (criticizing Sunstein and Thaler’s proposals); Douglas Glen Whitman & Mario J. Rizzo, Paternalist
Slopes, 2 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 411 (2007).
10. J.D. Trout, Paternalism and Cognitive Bias, 24 LAW & PHIL. 393, 416 (2005) (“If
individuals routinely make crucial and predictable errors in judgments about their own
welfare, and are unable to control doing so without turning life into an existence of contemplative paralysis or one of distorted value otherwise disavowed, then we should ask for
an argument against introducing institutional prosthetics.”).
11. At times this is an explicit choice. E.g., Glaeser, supra note 9, at 136 (choosing to
discuss paternalism in the context of bounded rationality rather than potentially emotional
“self-control problems”). But see Blumenthal, Affective Forecasting, supra note 4, at 234-37;
Camerer et al., supra note 9, at 1238-47; Cass R. Sunstein, The Laws of Fear, 115 HARV. L.
REV. 1119 (2002) (reviewing PAUL SLOVIC, THE PERCEPTION OF RISK (2000)).
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rather than addressing potential governmental steps—legislative or
judicial—to protect individuals from their errors. Third, although
commentators have recently noted the importance of comparing the
costs and benefits of paternalistic interventions, there has been little
specification of those costs and benefits. In particular, commentators
in this area have largely avoided the question of how difficult it
might be to correct such biases, and thus how effective any such interventions might in fact be.
In this Article, I evaluate and extend this developing discussion of
using social science data to justify paternalism and address these
three gaps in the literature. After Part II’s critical review of the existing literature, including discussion of whether paternalistic intervention is justified in the first place,12 I move in Part III to remedy
some of these gaps. I document not only cognitive but emotional biases that people are subject to, including a number that have been
little discussed in legal academia. I note the importance of such emotional biases to legal decisionmaking and illustrate potential legal
errors to which they may lead.13 I also mention implications of such
errors for paternalistic intervention by government, both by legislatures and by courts. In the distinct contexts of cognitive and emotional biases, one sort of government intervention may be appropriate where another is not. Finally, in Part IV, I take steps toward
evaluating the effectiveness of measures to correct cognitive and
emotional biases, a step mentioned but not pursued in discussions of
social science and paternalism.14 Specifically, I draw on empirical social science literature to examine whether effective mechanisms exist
to correct various cognitive and emotional biases at the individual
level, with implications for policy at the larger interpersonal and societal level.15 Throughout, I identify potential objections to some of
the points I raise, summarizing and concluding with further speculation about the appropriateness of paternalistic intervention by the
State.
To preview, my points might be made as follows: as scholars are
currently suggesting, based on people’s susceptibility to biased decisionmaking, third-party intervention may at times be warranted.
Most academic discussion of this point has focused on cognitive biases, but people are also—perhaps even more—susceptible to emotional biases, many of which I review, along with the potential interventions they imply. As difficult as cognitive biases are to correct,
12. See infra Part II.
13. See infra Part III.
14. Camerer et al., supra note 9, at 1214-18; Mitchell, supra note 9; Rachlinski, Uncertain Psychological Case, supra note 9, at 1219; See Trout, supra note 10, at 417 (“[T]here
has been far less research on correcting biases than [on] establishing their existence.”).
15. See infra Part IV.
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however, emotional biases may be even more difficult. That distinction has important consequences for the cost-benefit analysis that
should evaluate the propriety of a paternalistic intervention, and I
close the Article with a discussion of weighing such costs and benefits.
II. WHY PATERNALISM?
A. Defining Paternalism
As an initial matter, of course, what do we mean by “paternalism”? More broadly, why should any sort of intervention into an individual’s behavior, preferences, attitudes, or autonomy be warranted?
Unsurprisingly, there is no unequivocal definition of “paternalism” or of what constitutes a “paternalistic act.” Some definitions
suggest simply that it is an action taken in order to benefit the action’s target.16 Some focus as well on the degree of consent expressed
by the target, emphasizing that a paternalistic act toward B is one
that would be pursued by A if A acted for B’s benefit and would do so
even knowing that B did not consent.17 Most commonly, a paternalistic act is seen as some action by one party that interferes with another person’s freedom, with the goal of furthering the latter’s own
good.18
This conventional definition may be incomplete, however. Donald
VanDeVeer has pointed out an additional factor that will become
relevant in the present discussion, and that ties in to Shapiro and
16. See David L. Shapiro, Courts, Legislatures, and Paternalism, 74 VA. L. REV. 519,
522 (1988) (“At the core of every definition . . . is the notion that [a paternalistic action]
must be taken in order to benefit [the target].”). As Professor Shapiro and others recognize,
this is almost certainly too broad a definition. Id. at 523; see also DONALD VANDEVEER,
PATERNALISTIC INTERVENTION: THE MORAL BOUNDS ON BENEVOLENCE 17-18 (1986) (suggesting that simply benevolent or altruistic actions need not be considered “paternalistic”).
17. See Shapiro, supra note 16, at 523; cf. Paul Burrows, Analyzing Legal Paternalism, 15 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 489, 495 (1995) (arguing that an action is paternalistic “if its
intention . . . is to persuade, induce, or compel any individual to do something that he
would not otherwise have chosen to do, in order to bring benefits to that individual”).
18. See, e.g., Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE
L.J. 763, 763 (1983) (“[A]ny legal rule that prohibits an action on the ground that it would
be contrary to the actor’s own welfare is paternalistic.”); Trout, supra note 10, at 408 (defining paternalism as “the interference with a person’s actions or knowledge, against that
person’s will, for the purpose of promoting that person’s good”); VANDEVEER, supra note
16, at 18 (arguing that a paternalistic act is one that “interferes with another with the aim
of promoting his/her own good (or preventing harm from accruing to that other)”); Eyal
Zamir, The Efficiency of Paternalism, 84 VA. L. REV. 229, 236 (1998) (“Paternalism is intervention in a person’s freedom aimed at furthering her own good.”); cf. Andrew Caplin,
Fear as a Policy Instrument, in TIME AND DECISION: ECONOMIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVES ON INTERTEMPORAL CHOICE 441, 454 (George Loewenstein et al. eds., 2003)
(“Even if head-in-the-sand behavior is currently attractive, the social planner may have
reason to intervene if he or she believes that the subject will later be grateful for intervention.”).
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others’ connection of paternalism with consent. That is, conduct may
in fact be paternalistic even when it apparently is done with the target’s consent. In VanDeVeer’s example, an individual who believes he
will drink too much at a party gives his car keys to a friend, asking
the friend to hide the keys or in some other way prevent him from
driving home.19 When the friend does in fact refuse to return the keys
upon the drinker’s post-debauch request, he may be seen to be acting
paternalistically—acting against the drinker’s wishes for the
drinker’s own good—despite the drinker’s (initial) consent. Thus, under VanDeVeer’s approach, “an action is paternalist if it is at odds
with the subject’s preferences at the time of the action; paternalist
action may be justified, however, by prior consent.”20
Thus, paternalistic action need not only be action that violates a
subject’s consent. More important, this example demonstrates the
“multiple selves” problem: which preference should be privileged
when someone expresses a preference at Time1 that changes at
Time2?21 This tension arises in the opposite direction as well, when
courts step in to protect an individual from his own previous decisionmaking biases or errors. In these circumstances, an individual
made a decision at Time1 that he realizes at Time2 does not reflect
his true preferences (this reverses VanDeVeer’s example, where the
Time1 choice reflects the individual’s true preferences, but the Time2
choice—made when inebriated—does not). He therefore seeks judicial intervention at Time2 to release him from the consequences of
that decision.22 In both sets of circumstances, there is a tension be-

19. VANDEVEER, supra note 16, at 23-24.
20. Shapiro, supra note 16, at 524 n.17.
21. Blumenthal, Affective Forecasting, supra note 4, at 179 n.156 (noting multiple
selves problem); Carl H. Coleman, Procreative Liberty and Contemporaneous Choice: An
Inalienable Rights Approach to Frozen Embryo Disputes, 84 MINN. L. REV. 55, 92 (1999)
(raising issue of “which phase of an individual’s evolving personality has priority when her
wishes [at Time1] differ from those [at Time2]”); Daniel Kahneman, New Challenges to the
Rationality Assumption, 3 LEGAL THEORY 105, 120 (1997) (noting the likely “incompatible”
preferences of a person’s “separate selves” and asking which should be privileged). For empirical evidence that this problem occurs, see Emily Pronin & Lee Ross, Temporal Differences in Trait Self-Ascription: When the Self is Seen as an Other, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. (2006) (demonstrating that individuals see their past and future selves as a different person from their present self).
22. Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Abortion, Persuasion, and Emotion: Implications of Social
Science Research on Emotion for Reading Casey, 83 WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008)
[hereinafter Blumenthal, Abortion, Persuasion, and Emotion]; see also Blumenthal, Affective Forecasting, supra note 4, at 235-37; infra Part III.C.2.c.i (discussing, in the context of
paternalism, one commentator’s suggestion that courts broaden securities law doctrine to
include consideration of potential emotional biases in order to protect investors against
emotional, as well as cognitive, errors). This is an example of what Klick and Mitchell refer
to more broadly as “ex post paternalism.” Klick & Mitchell, supra note 9, at 1636. With
Klick and Mitchell, then, I consider such judicial paternalism “simply shorthand for government assistance available to protect a party from an earlier, supposedly irrational act.”
Id. at 1636 n.48.
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tween an expressed preference at one time that (a) is different from
that expressed at another time and, more important, (b) does not reflect what the decisionmaker’s true preferences would be at the time
of the expressed preference. Either example, therefore, may warrant
intervention to privilege the true preference, whether expressed at
Time1 or Time2.23 The question thus becomes, what sort of intervention might be allowed to privilege one preference set over a conflicting set?24
Other definitions of paternalism seem overbroad. In a recent article on paternalism, Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler allude to government rules about who should bear the loss in an accident as an
example of “[d]efault rules” that “much of the time” influence preferences and choices, and that thus constitute paternalism.25 They also
suggest that paternalistic intervention may be “inevitable,” in the
sense that default rules always have some effect on decisionmaking.26
Thus, any time a central planner establishes some such rule, that
planner has acted paternalistically to an extent, influencing the individual’s choice.27 Implicit in their discussion of default rules is that
any government action—even a “minimum of state intervention”28—
can qualify as paternalistic.
But all state action, even that which “affect[s] preferences and
choices,” need not be considered paternalistic in the conventional
sense.29 Their example—deciding which party should bear a loss—
23. See Blumenthal, Affective Forecasting, supra note 4, at 216 n.400 and following
text (suggesting some circumstances in which such intervention can be appropriate). This
approach, of course, is not just a means for an individual to simply change his mind from
Time1 to Time2—an “escape hatch”—and thereby obtain judicial intervention. See id. at
213 nn.386-87 and accompanying text; Coleman, supra note 21, at 98-99 n.209. The distinction is related to Professor Shapiro’s framing of “ ‘regret theory’ [which] distinguish[es]
between disappointment, which we need not worry about . . . and regret, which is cause for
concern. . . . A person suffers regret if he commits himself to a course of action that he later
wishes to abandon because of a change of goals.” Shapiro, supra note 16, at 549.
24. See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 3, at 1124 (“The proper answer to [such] questions might rest, at least in part, on whether we believe that the present self or the future
self best represents the preferences of the single individual. In all likelihood, this will have
to be a situation-specific judgment.”).
25. Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 9, at 1174-75 (“[A] minimum of state intervention
is always necessary. . . . When a loss is left where it falls in an auto accident, it is not because G[-]d so ordained it. Rather it is because the state has granted the injurer an entitlement to be free of liability and will intervene to prevent the victim’s friends, if they are
stronger, from taking compensation from the injurer.” (quoting Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1090-91 (1972))).
26. Id. at 1174.
27. Specifically, Sunstein and Thaler argue that often, “some organization or agent
must make a choice that will affect the behavior of some other people. There is, in those
situations, no alternative to a kind of paternalism—at least in the form of an intervention
that affects what people choose.” Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 9, at 1164.
28. Id. at 1174.
29. Id.
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may affect behavior, but is not designed to protect a decisionmaker
from her own expressed (and perhaps biased) preferences; indeed, in
their own terms, the rule protects the injurer from the behavior of
others and, perhaps, protects society against individual inefficiencies
and biases.
To the extent that this argument is not tautological, then it is
somewhat overbroad. Certainly, not every choice or rule by an agent
that simply affects the decisions or behavior of a target need be considered paternalistic. Affecting someone’s behavior or choices is almost certainly a necessary condition for conduct to be paternalistic,
but for it to be a sufficient condition suggests that any governmental
action should be so considered, which is too broad a claim.30 That
said, default rules are especially influential given individuals’ preference for the status quo. These authors’ emphasis on both the power
of default rules to affect behavior and the frequency with which such
rules must be chosen is important and describes one of the more effective potential mechanisms for intervention.31
Thus, despite recognizing the looseness in the term, I use “paternalism” in a conventional sense, to suggest some sort of third-party
intervention into behavior or—in the present context—into individuals’ decisionmaking processes, with the goal of protecting individuals
against the consequences of actual or potential biases in that process.32 Given the present discussion, I incorporate VanDeVeer’s notion
30. See supra note 25 and following text; cf. supra note 16 and accompanying text. Indeed, elsewhere in their article, Sunstein and Thaler use a different definition of paternalism, closer to the one sketched above. Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 9, at 1162 (“[A] policy
therefore counts as ‘paternalistic’ if it attempts to influence the choices of affected parties
in a way that will make choosers better off.”).
31. Professor Mitchell objects to this inevitability argument on empirical grounds as
well, suggesting that the possibility of correcting (or “debiasing”) such individuals’ biased
decisionmaking undercuts Sunstein and Thaler’s claim. See Mitchell, supra note 9, at
1248-60. Despite my objection to Sunstein and Thaler’s suggestion, I am not sure Mitchell’s
point is wholly persuasive either. As discussed further below, and as Mitchell recognizes,
debiasing is in fact just one (albeit weaker) mode of paternalistic intervention. Cf. Jolls et
al., supra note 3, at 1544 (“[G]overnment intervention need not come in highly coercive
forms . . . . For instance, in the contexts of risks such as smoking, might debiasing techniques work to link the statistical evidence with the personal reality?”). Consequently, if a
goal of intervention is to improve decisionmaking (a goal Mitchell challenges, see Mitchell,
supra note 9, at 1260-69; but see Klick & Mitchell, supra note 9), then biased decisionmaking does plausibly warrant intervention. Moreover, as discussed further in Part IV, debiasing is often unsuccessful and, at times, counterproductive. In any event, Mitchell’s challenge to Sunstein and Thaler focuses more on the libertarian part of their approach, not
the paternalism part—that is, on their assertion that a committed libertarian would find
their model of paternalism appealing. See Mitchell, supra note 9, at 1247-48 (suggesting
that the focus of his criticisms is the libertarian aspect of Sunstein and Thaler’s claims);
see also Glaeser, supra note 9, at 135 (disagreeing with Sunstein and Thaler’s assertion).
32. Elsewhere I note the issue of what role intervention might play, not in the context
of avoiding disutility, but of enhancing individuals’ welfare from baseline. See generally Peter H. Huang & Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Positive Law and Policy, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
POSITIVE PSYCHOLOGY (Shane J. Lopez ed., forthcoming 2008) [hereinafter Huang & Blu-
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that such intervention (“interference”) will often at least appear to be
against the target’s preferences or expressed interests, whether articulated at Time1 or Time2. Specifically, what I will call emotional
paternalism is conduct, typically governmental, that intervenes in an
actor’s decision or decisionmaking, at Time1 or Time2, either when
that decisionmaking involves judgments about emotions or emotionally-laden topics, or when it was or has the potential to be biased by
affective factors (that is, emotions evoked by the target of a judgment
or incidental, transient moods).
B. Justifying Paternalism
Of more concern, perhaps, given the pejorative connotation traditionally attached to the term,33 is why commentators are increasingly
willing to discuss some sort of paternalism. One answer, useful as a
first step—but, I suggest, ultimately unsatisfactory—is Sunstein and
Thaler’s argument that even if paternalism per se is a so-called
“evil,” it may be a lesser one, one that is necessary, or at least inevitable.34 A stronger answer, to which they also point, is grounded in
empirical evidence suggesting that the usual objections to paternalism are weaker than is traditionally assumed.
The first such objection is typically that people know their own
preferences and are best at choosing them. Libertarian philosophy,35
welfare economics, and numerous legal doctrines36 rely on this assumption. But substantial empirical evidence shows this is not always the case. At a broad level, it is increasingly apparent that people are unable to accurately predict their emotional reactions to future events and, thus, are unable to accurately predict how happy or
unhappy an event—such as the satisfaction of a particular preference—might make them.37 I have suggested elsewhere that “if we do

menthal, Positive Law and Policy]; Peter H. Huang & Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Positive Policy/Positive Institutions, in HANDBOOK OF POSITIVE PSYCHOLOGY (C.R. Snyder & Shane J.
Lopez eds., forthcoming 2008) [hereinafter Huang & Blumenthal, Positive Policy/Positive
Institutions].
33. See, e.g., Paul Burrows, Patronising Paternalism, 45 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 542,
542 (1993) (“ ‘[P]aternalism’ is a term of abuse. Paternalism is seen as illiberal, coercive,
arrogant and patronizing . . . .”); Glaeser, supra note 9, at 133 (noting “economics’ traditional hostility towards paternalism”); Shapiro, supra note 16, at 519 (“[P]aternalism has
not been held in high regard by democratic theorists and practitioners.”).
34. Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 9, at 1164.
35. See, e.g., James W. Child, Can Libertarianism Sustain a Fraud Standard?, 104
ETHICS 722, 729-30 (1994) (describing assumption of libertarianism that people have a
“stable set of preferences”); Mitchell, supra note 9.
36. See Rachlinski, Uncertain Psychological Case, supra note 9, at 1178 (“The ability
of individuals to make good choices for themselves lies at the heart of an enormous collection of legal rules.”).
37. Blumenthal, Affective Forecasting, supra note 4, at 166-72; Daniel Kahneman et
al., Back to Bentham? Explorations of Experienced Utility, 112 Q.J. ECON. 375 (1997);
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not know what will make us happy or unhappy—or, more precisely,
how much something will make us happy or unhappy and how long it
will do so—then we can never be sure how to maximize happiness or
minimize unhappiness.”38
More narrowly, people often make a variety of poor decisions; financial ones, for instance, especially prospective decisions such as
concerning savings and retirement options.39 Sometimes this is due
to active choices that turn out to be nonoptimal; other times it is due
to inertia or a disinclination to make decisions (for example, choices
that are influenced by the “default rules” Sunstein and Thaler discuss).40 Such self-injurious choices occur in health and safety contexts
as well:41 overoptimism and other self-serving cognitive biases can
lead to misperceptions of risks to the self—such as a smoker’s underestimate of his risk of dying from lung cancer, despite an overestimate of the link between smoking and cancer—that lead to nonoptimal, unhealthy behavior.42 Similarly, consumers might be willing,
because of overoptimism, to waive a right to recover for various sorts
of injury.43 And such behavior occurs in that ostensibly most rational
of arenas—the marketplace. For instance, as discussed below, Russell Korobkin has argued for an expanded reading of unconscionability doctrine based on the likelihood that cognitive biases will allow
sellers to manipulate buyers.44 And erroneous estimates of the likelihood of one’s own breach, or that of the other contracting party, can
lead parties to bear risks that they did not fully consider, or to fail to
consider appropriate remedies for breach.45 Of course, such evidence
of bounded self-knowledge46 need not be read as mandating paternalistic intervention, but simply as weakening the traditional consequentialist objection to paternalistic policies.47

Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, The Objectivity of Well-Being and the Objectives of Property
Law, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1669, 1678-79, 1682 n.58 (2003).
38. Blumenthal, Affective Forecasting, supra note 4, at 231.
39. E.g., Deborah M. Weiss, Paternalistic Pension Policy: Psychological Evidence and
Economic Theory, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1275 (1991).
40. Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 9, at 1181.
41. See generally Rachlinski, Uncertain Psychological Case, supra note 9, at 1180-81
(giving examples).
42. Id. at 1180 (citing Paul Slovic, Do Adolescent Smokers Know the Risks?, 47 DUKE
L.J. 1133, 1137 (1998)).
43. E.g., Paul Bennett Marrow, Crafting a Remedy for the Naughtiness of Procedural
Unconscionability, 34 CUMB. L. REV. 11, 26-34 (2003); Edward L. Rubin, Types of Contracts, Interventions of Law, 45 WAYNE L. REV. 1903, 1910-11 (2000).
44. Korobkin, supra note 9, at 1206.
45. See Rachlinski, Uncertain Psychological Case, supra note 9, at 1178-79 (giving examples).
46. Chris Guthrie suggested this term to me.
47. Cf. infra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
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Second, there is the usual argument from autonomy, traditionally
relied on by legal theorists48 and, more recently, by those empirical
researchers apparently uncomfortable with the direction in which
their data point:49 people’s freedom to make choices, even nonoptimal
ones, should be valued per se.50 Alternatively, as a sort of mixed utility and autonomy argument, we should value people’s preferences for
the freedom to make choices. That is, the freedom to choose should
also be protected because people value that freedom itself.51
In his assessments of paternalism, Paul Burrows has identified
two general justifications for the presumption that the freedom to
choose is valuable per se and warrants protection against interference.52 First, choosing is a skill that improves with experience;53
moreover, choosing and accepting responsibility for one’s choices
builds character.54 Second, reflecting in part the mixed justification
noted above, “choosing is an act which yields utility independently of
the nature of the outcome of the choice.”55 Professor Burrows criticized these claims, pointing out, for instance, that choice between

48. See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 16, at 538 (suggesting that numerous courts’ willingness to sustain challenges to various sorts of legislation in fact stems from this antipaternalist perspective, that is, the importance placed on the right to be “let alone” in making choices for oneself).
49. See Blumenthal, Affective Forecasting, supra note 4, at 236 (noting this hesitancy
in researchers discussing such findings); cf. Colin F. Camerer, Wanting, Liking, and Learning: Neuroscience and Paternalism, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 87, 93 (2006) (“By the way, note that
I am truly not an eager paternalist.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private
Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1129, 1171 (1986) (distinguishing between governmental
“interference” and “troublesome” paternalism.)
50. See Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 9, at 1167 n.22 (“Some of the standard arguments against paternalism rest not on consequences but on autonomy—on a belief that
people are entitled to make their own choices even if they err.”). But see, e.g., John A.
Robertson, Precommitment Strategies for Disposition of Frozen Embryos, 50 EMORY L.J.
989, 1024 (2001) (suggesting that the potential gains from precommitment strategies he
argues for “should not be shunted aside with an ipse dixit about personal liberty”).
51. See Zamir, supra note 18, at 240 (suggesting that “[h]aving relatively broad freedom to make one’s own decisions, including wrong ones, is probably quite high on most
people’s list of ideal preferences”).
52. Burrows, supra note 33, at 556.
53. Id. Klick and Mitchell also seem to advance this approach, relying on psychological theory suggesting that the decisionmaking process tends toward a learning process,
and thus, people should be allowed to make mistakes and learn from them. See Klick &
Mitchell, supra note 9; see also Shapiro, supra note 16, at 546 (“[T]he very ability to
choose—which necessarily implies the ability to make poor choices by some objective standard—is critical to the growth of our diverse intellectual, emotional, and volitional capacities.”). That theory, and the findings upon which Klick and Mitchell rely, however, may not
be as clear-cut as they suggest. See James P. Byrnes, The Development of Decision-making,
31 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 208, 214 (2002) (the psychologist on whose work they rely most
heavily notes that despite his model and findings, “learning is by no means automatic
when people are shown the errors of their ways,” outlining circumstances in which such
learning may not occur).
54. Burrows, supra note 33, at 556.
55. Id.
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unpleasant options is likely painful and may not build character.56
Moreover, he suggested that there is no presumptive reason to assume that skill in making decisions in one context should translate
to other contexts.57
Over and above these conceptual qualifications, empirical research undercuts the second general justification in at least two
ways.58 First, it seems that people often prefer not to have to make
decisions.59 During the decisionmaking process, individuals tend to
prefer to “keep[ ] doors open”; that is, to retain the option of changing
their minds, even at the expense of decision quality.60 Second, when
they do make decisions, both the preference for choice61 and having
more options from which to choose can lead to less utility and worse
decisions.62 Empirical research shows that although people often
want a decision to be reversible—that is, they prefer the possibility of
changing their mind—they are often less satisfied with their choice
when it is reversible relative to when they make a decision and are

56. Id. at 556-57.
57. Id. at 557. But see Klick & Mitchell, supra note 9.
58. The research findings thus do address the autonomy rationale “head-on.” Shapiro,
supra note 16, at 547 (“Some defenses of limited paternalist intervention do not attempt to
meet these [autonomy] arguments head-on.”).
59. See Jane Beattie et al., Psychological Determinants of Decision Attitude, 7 J.
BEHAV. DEC. MAKING 129 (1994) (noting situations leading to hesitancy to make decisions);
Barry Schwartz et al., Maximizing Versus Satisficing: Happiness Is a Matter of Choice, 83
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1178 (2002) (reporting that increased options often make
decisionmakers less happy with outcomes); Cass R. Sunstein & Edna Ullmann-Margalit,
Second-Order Decisions, 110 ETHICS 5 (1999) (discussing contexts in which people prefer to
have others make their decisions); Philip E. Tetlock et al., The Psychology of the Unthinkable: Taboo Trade-Offs, Forbidden Base Rates, and Heretical Counterfactuals, 78 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 853 (2000) (noting tendencies to reject or avoid making decisions involving highly morally-charged issues); Richard Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory
of Consumer Choice, 1 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 39 (1980); see also Korobkin, supra note 9,
at 1223 (noting consumers’ preference for minimizing the effort of a decision); Amy B.
Monahan, Addressing the Problem of Impatients, Impulsives, and Other Imperfect Actors in
401(k) Plans, 23 VA. TAX. REV. 471, 509-10 & n.157 (2004) (discussing pension plan participants’ tendency to procrastinate in deciding to enroll; noting success of automatic enrollment procedures in avoiding procrastination due to “low transaction costs”).
60. Jiwoong Shin & Dan Ariely, Keeping Doors Open: The Effect of Unavailability on
Incentives to Keep Options Viable, 50 MGMT. SCI. 575, 575 (2004).
61. See Daniel T. Gilbert & Jane E.J. Ebert, Decisions and Revisions: The Affective
Forecasting of Changeable Outcomes, 82 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 503 (2002).
62. Schwartz et al., supra note 59, at 1178-79; cf. Ellen Berscheid & Bruce Campbell,
The Changing Longevity of Heterosexual Close Relationships: A Commentary and Forecast,
in THE JUSTICE MOTIVE IN SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: ADAPTING TO TIMES OF SCARCITY AND
CHANGE 209, 223 (Melvin J. Lerner & Sally C. Lerner eds., 1981) (noting, in quite a different context, that “[t]o have a perpetual choice means that one must choose not once, but
over and over again. And to do so, one must continually expend time and energy in evaluating and reevaluating the wisdom of the choice.”). In fact, the simple act of considering alternatives and choosing between options can increase the appeal of the foregone option. Ziv
Carmon et al., Option Attachment: When Deliberating Makes Choosing Feel Like Losing, 30
J. CONSUMER RES. 15 (2003).
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committed to it.63 More broadly, recent empirical work calls into
question the traditional assumptions that choice—and the perception
of control over that choice—generates utility and psychological wellbeing.64 In fact, too much choice can be conflicting, difficult, and may
even lead to decreased experienced utility.65 Thus, the assumption
that people value making decisions is often wrong. Moreover, even
when it is correct, the ability to choose can lead to decreased, not increased, utility.66 Another aspect of the autonomy argument is thus
weakened. Again, this weakening does not mean the argument is invalid or that paternalistic policies necessarily trump any claim to individual autonomy. The data simply suggest that the standard objections must meet higher hurdles than have heretofore been set in order to be fully persuasive.67
C. Literature on Social Science and Paternalism
Building on these and other data, legal commentators have thus
lately moved the long-standing debate over the propriety of paternalistic intervention into the empirical realm. Such analysis proffers social science findings as one response to traditional objections to paternalism. For instance, in a provocative article presenting much of
the cognitive heuristics and biases literature in a systematic way,68
Christine Jolls, Cass Sunstein, and Richard Thaler identified an
“anti-antipaternalism” argument reflecting the discussion above.69 In
63. Gilbert & Ebert, supra note 61.
64. See, e.g., Ap Dijksterhuis, Think Different: The Merits of Unconscious Thought in
Preference Development and Decision Making, 87 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 586
(2004) (reporting experiments showing that unconscious decisions can be better than more
fully considered decisions).
65. Sheena S. Iyengar & Mark R. Lepper, When Choice is Demotivating: Can One Desire Too Much of a Good Thing?, 79 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 995, 1003-04 (2000)
[hereinafter Iyengar & Lepper, When Choice is Demotivating] (reporting that people are
more satisfied when choices are limited); Schwartz et al., supra note 59, at 1179 (suggesting that for some people, too much choice can lead to negative psychological well-being); see
also Sheena S. Iyengar & Mark R. Lepper, Choice and Its Consequences: On the Costs and
Benefits of Self-Determination, in SELF AND MOTIVATION: EMERGING PSYCHOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVES 71, 76-83 (Abraham Tesser et al. eds., 2002) (noting cultural influences on
the benefits of choice).
66. See Iyengar & Lepper, When Choice is Demotivating, supra note 65, at 1004
(showing that manufacturers and marketers have identified the problem of “too much
choice” and that one company found that reducing the number of products in a product line
led to increased sales). One reason the Iyengar and Lepper findings are surprising is an established line of psychological scholarship supporting the intuitive link between choice and
utility. See id. at 995-96 (describing studies). Taking all these findings together might suggest that for various choices and for some people there may be some optimal number of
choices. If so, one question in the paternalism context is whether government can and
should intervene to identify and administer that optimal number.
67. Of course, the imposition on autonomy could simply be seen as another cost to be
considered in the cost-benefit analysis. See infra Part V.
68. Jolls et al., supra note 3.
69. Id. at 1541-45.
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particular, they addressed the standard consequentialist objection to
paternalism that people generally know what is good for them. They
characterized this objection, reflected in the traditional law and economics approach, as presuming that “citizens, assuming they have
reasonable access to relevant information, are . . . the best judges of
what will promote their own welfare.”70 Jolls and colleagues responded, however, that the behavioral law and economics literature
demonstrates that people are likely worse at judging what will promote their own welfare than we have traditionally assumed. To the
extent this is so, the objection to paternalistic policies is correspondingly weakened—“anti-antipaternalism.”71
Jolls and colleagues thus set out “a skepticism about antipaternalism but not an affirmative defense of paternalism.”72 In other articles, however, Sunstein and Thaler have extended this approach,
suggesting that some sort of paternalistic intervention is in fact inevitable.73 Again, they argued that often an organization or agent
must make some choice that will affect the behavior and decisionmaking of others; therefore, to that extent, any such choice can be
seen as paternalistic.74 In a useful approach, Sunstein and Thaler
documented various grades of paternalistic interventions—“minimal
paternalism, required active choices, procedural constraints, and
substantive constraints”75—and set out broad suggestions for how to
evaluate the propriety of any such policy using cost-benefit analysis.76
In an article published about the same time as Sunstein and
Thaler’s, Jeff Rachlinski also detailed a number of (primarily cognitive) errors, noting the potential paternalistic policies those errors
seem to warrant.77 Rachlinski suggested that policy makers cannot
rely on “merely identifying . . . a cognitive [or emotional] error” to
justify paternalistic intervention.78 Rather, he too advocated costbenefit analysis in evaluating such policies; specifically, “the costs of
70. Id. at 1541.
71. Id. at 1541-45.
72. Id. at 1541.
73. Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 9, at 1171.
74. E.g., Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 9, at 1164, 1174. But see supra notes 25-31
and accompanying text.
75. Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 9, at 1167, 1188.
76. Id. at 1190-95.
77. Rachlinski, Uncertain Psychological Case, supra note 9.
78. Id. at 1225; see id. at 1168 (“Even heuristically driven individual choice can be
trusted far more than legal scholars have realized, so long as individuals can learn better
decisionmaking strategies or delegate their choices to those who have. Merely linking a
cognitive bias in judgment to a decision that law could regulate should not support implementing a constraint on individual choice.”); Sunstein, supra note 49, at 1139 (“[T]he identification of defects in a system based on private preferences is a necessary but not sufficient condition for a regulatory solution.”).
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either learning to adopt a superior approach to a choice or relying on
others to make a choice” must outweigh the cost of the policy.79 Thus,
included in the assessment of the costs of a particular policy must be
the difficulty involved in helping people learn to avoid or correct the
bias at which that policy is aimed, and/or the costs of arranging for
someone else to make the relevant decision.80 Neither Professor
Rachlinski nor other scholars, however, examined such costs in much
detail.81
These commentators have focused primarily on the first line of
scholarship challenging the traditional rational decisionmaker
model—that is, the “Kahneman-Tversky,” cognitive heuristics and
biases line. But there are a number of important contexts in which
information about emotional biases, and about decisionmaking “under the influence” of emotion—all of which can lead to nonoptimal
decisions—can have implications for third-party intervention into
such decisions, or into the process of making them.
Little analysis of these topics exists, however, in the context of
emotion. I recently made some speculative comments in a discussion
of one particular emotional error involving affective forecasting (i.e.,
the prediction of future emotional states).82 Camerer and colleagues
discuss various instances of “cooling-off periods,” in which policies
are established that allow consumers to reconsider decisions made
under the influence of emotional factors, presumably when they have
returned to a cooler, more “rational” state83 (as I point out below,
however, cooling-off periods may in fact not be as effective as has
been assumed). Sunstein and Thaler mention cooling-off periods as
well, though their brief discussion is somewhat ambiguous as to
whether the goal of such policies is to correct cognitive or emotional
susceptibilities; Rachlinski gives a similar impression.84 Similarly,
79. Rachlinski, Uncertain Psychological Case, supra note 9, at 1219.
80. Cf. Sunstein & Ullmann-Margalit, supra note 59 (discussing steps individuals
might take to arrange for others to make relevant decisions). Colin Camerer and colleagues
recently made a similar argument to Rachlinski’s in documenting a range of errors in decisionmaking that might warrant paternalistic intervention, both in the private domain and
by the state. Camerer et al., supra note 9. In recommending “asymmetric paternalism,” defined as regulation that benefits those who are subject to decisionmaking errors but that
imposes little cost on those who make fully rational decisions, they acknowledge the importance of considering the “implementation costs” of a particular regulation or policy. Id. at
1212, 1219.
81. Id. at 1254 (calling for less debate over whether paternalism is justified and more
empirical discussion of “whether the benefits of mistake prevention are larger than the
harms imposed on rational people”); Sunstein, supra note 49, at 1173 (“To be justified, the
governmental solution must make the situation better rather than worse.”).
82. Blumenthal, Affective Forecasting, supra note 4, at Part III.C.
83. Camerer et al., supra note 9, at 1238-47.
84. See Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 9, at 1188-89 (discussing cooling-off periods).
Sunstein and Thaler discuss cooling-off periods as protecting against decisions made in
“the heat of the moment” or when “emotions are likely to be running high”; still, they sug-

2007]

EMOTIONAL PATERNALISM

17

Sunstein’s discussion of implications of individuals’ inaccurate perception of risk,85 in which he also draws inferences about interventions, has been sharply criticized for seeming to frame “fear” as too
cognitive or rationalistic—that is, for reducing the emotion of fear to,
in essence, cognitive misperception of risk.86
Thus, what little work exists in this context has either been preliminary,87 has focused primarily on cognitive biases, or has arguably
conflated cognition and emotion.88 It often focuses on intervention by
private parties, rather than addressing potential governmental steps
(legislative or judicial) to protect individuals from their errors.89 Finally, much of this work has not considered in detail actual social
science data about the emotions, about the biases or errors in decisionmaking to which emotions can lead, or about the effectiveness
with which any of these biases might be corrected.90 The remainder of
this Article starts to remedy these gaps. I begin with a more detailed
discussion of cognition and emotion in general, and of these cognitive
and emotional biases in particular, including the implications those
biases have for third-party, “protective” intervention.

gest that both “bounded rationality and bounded self-control” are the underlying concerns.
Id. at 1189. The suggestion seems to have as much a cognitive focus as an emotional focus.
Rachlinski raises cooling-off periods in the context of protecting against “cognitive strategies sales people might use to induce consumers to enter into transactions.” Rachlinski,
Uncertain Psychological Case, supra note 9, at 1224 n.297.
85. Sunstein, supra note 11.
86. Rachel F. Moran, Fear Unbound: A Reply to Professor Sunstein, 42 WASHBURN
L.J. 1 (2002). In a more recent book review, Sunstein does raise other effects of emotion on
perceptions and decisionmaking. Cass R. Sunstein, Hazardous Heuristics, 70 U. CHI. L.
REV. 751 (2003) (reviewing HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE
JUDGEMENT (Thomas Gilovoch et al. eds., 2002)). Two of his suggestions are relevant here.
First, he points to the phenomenon of probability neglect, noting that when a judgment
about the outcome of a particular action is accompanied by strong emotion, or is otherwise
heavily affect-laden, people’s decisions about those outcomes are relatively impervious to
changes in the probability of the outcome. Id. at 771; Sunstein, supra note 7, at 70-82. This
phenomenon is discussed further below. Second, he suggests more broadly that emotions
may act similarly to “low-level” or automatic cognitive judgments, “quick but error-prone,”
that can be corrected upon more conscious reflection. Sunstein, Hazardous Heuristics, supra, at 768-70. He notes, however, that such correction may be difficult, depending on the
emotion. Id. at 771 (“[W]hen people are anxious and fearful, they are less likely to engage
in systematic processing, and [such correction] is especially unreliable.”). A more detailed
discussion of such correction difficulties will figure prominently in Part IV, infra. See also
Blumenthal, Abortion, Persuasion, and Emotion, supra note 22 (discussing this statement
by Sunstein).
87. Blumenthal, Affective Forecasting, supra note 4, at 234-37.
88. See Sunstein, supra note 11; Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 9, at 1188-89.
89. E.g., Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 9, at 1164-66 (discussing “paternalistic” steps
by cafeteria supervisors at a business). But see id. at 1195-96 (describing Swiss intervention to try to improve pension fund investment).
90. E.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD.
1059, 1070-71 nn.38-40 and accompanying text (2000); Sunstein, supra note 11, at 1140
nn.88-89 and accompanying text; Sunstein, supra note 7, at 66 n.26; Cass R. Sunstein et
al., Predictably Incoherent Judgments, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1153, 1164 n.43 (2002).
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III. IMPLICATIONS OF COGNITIVE AND EMOTIONAL BIASES FOR
PATERNALISTIC INTERVENTION
The previous Part outlined some preliminary analysis applying
social science research to justify the possibility of paternalistic policies (or at least responding to antipaternalistic objections to certain
intervention). In this Part, I extend the discussion. First, I clarify my
distinction between cognition and emotion in Part III.A. After summarizing in Part III.B some of the cognitive biases that have been
identified, I proceed in Part III.C to a discussion of emotional biases.
There, I first identify three important theoretical distinctions to consider. Using those distinctions as an underlying framework, I then
discuss in more detail a number of emotional biases and their implications for paternalistic policies.
A. Emotion and Cognition
I particularly want to distinguish for present purposes—to the extent possible—between “cognition” or “cognitive processes,” and
“emotion” or “emotional processes.” There are two primary justifications for doing so, especially in the context of examining paternalism.
First, few previous treatments make the distinction. Second, and
more important, doing so highlights differences between cognitive
and emotional biases in terms of the ability to correct them. In turn,
as I show in Part IV, differences in the correctability of emotional
versus cognitive biases can have crucial implications for the likelihood of any intervention succeeding, as well as for the level of invasiveness necessary for such an intervention to succeed. That is, to the
extent one type of bias might be easier to correct, less “interference”
with individual decisionmaking might be necessary and the intervention will be more likely to succeed. Finally, the degree of interference
and the potential for success both have important implications in
turn for the tolerance with which a particular intervention is likely
to be received by the target and by the public in general. These
points are discussed in Parts IV and V.
To some extent, this distinction is artificial; emotional and cognitive or rational processes are somewhat related. This is especially
relevant because the philosophical work on emotions most cited in
law operates from this approach, arguing that emotions are typically
based on some sort of beliefs or judgments about the world.91
Jon Elster, for instance, argues on the one hand that emotions
typically “have cognitive antecedents. . . . [They] are triggered by be-

91. E.g., ELSTER, supra note 4; NUSSBAUM, UPHEAVALS OF THOUGHT, supra note 4.
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liefs about events or states of the world.”92 On the other hand, Elster
qualifies his view in a number of ways.93 The most important is his
discussion of neurobiological evidence showing that perceptual cues
that give rise to emotional reactions—such as fear—can actually bypass conscious awareness. Specifically, there are two neural pathways from sensory areas to the amygdala, where a fear response occurs. One goes through the neocortex, where most conscious cognition occurs; but a second, “quick and dirty” one goes directly from the
sensory areas to the amygdala.94 For Elster, identifying preconscious
or unconscious emotion demonstrates an independence of affect and
cognition. Ultimately, however, the discussion is “not centrally important” to his project; it does not adequately reflect the emotional
experiences of everyday life.95 He is also not comfortable generalizing
from these findings to all emotions (though he might be more comfortable if he looked to the substantial other evidence pointing to
such rapid, preconscious emotional processing and influences96).
The other influential approach from philosophy is Martha Nussbaum’s theory of emotions, which also grounds them in judgments or
beliefs. Hers is perhaps a more extreme perspective than others’,

92. ELSTER, supra note 4, at 249-50; see id. at 254 (noting that cognitive antecedents
of emotion include beliefs about one’s own emotions, probabilistic beliefs, and beliefs about
others’ emotions, motivations, and beliefs). As a consequence, he argues, emotions may be
rational or irrational when “well grounded in the evidence” or not. Id. at 250. Martha
Nussbaum makes a similar point, arguing that emotions based on incorrect beliefs are
“false” emotions. NUSSBAUM, UPHEAVALS OF THOUGHT, supra note 4, at 46. This contrasts
sharply with some psychologists’ views, which suggest that “[c]ognitions can be evaluated
for their correctness. . . . But preferences [and emotions] cannot be judged for accuracy or
validity.” Robert B. Zajonc, Emotions, in 1 HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 591, 597
(Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 1998).
Parts of Elster’s approach, and the first part of Nussbaum’s account (described below),
reflect a line of emotion research in the social sciences (social psychology in particular)
called “appraisal theory,” which suggests that emotions proceed from a person’s subjective
evaluations of his circumstances. For a detailed review of appraisal theory, see Phoebe C.
Ellsworth & Klaus R. Scherer, Appraisal Processes in Emotion, in HANDBOOK OF
AFFECTIVE SCIENCES, supra note 4, at 572.
93. First, he notes that the relationship between the cognitive antecedents and the
emotional experience “is a matter of some controversy.” ELSTER, supra note 4, at 251. Second, he notes that his discussion can help distinguish between whether someone is experiencing “an emotion or something else, such as a cognition.” Id. at 246. Third, he notes that
this approach may not be able to account for certain emotional experiences such as music
appreciation. Id. at 245.
94. Id. at 268.
95. Moreover, it convinces him that appraisal theory, see supra note 92, is false. Appraisal theorists familiar with this objection, however, respond that the processes they suggest do not preclude low-level, subcortical evaluations. E.g., Ellsworth & Scherer, supra
note 92, at 585.
96. See Robert B. Zajonc, Feeling and Thinking: Closing the Debate Over the Independence of Affect, in FEELING AND THINKING: THE ROLE OF AFFECT IN SOCIAL COGNITION,
supra note 5, at 31.
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suggesting explicitly that emotions are cognitive judgments.97 What
she means by this is, in part, that emotions involve “cognitive appraisals or evaluations” (a relatively uncontroversial assumption98);
but she also (in my view, overbroadly) implies that the very transmission of perceptual information in the brain that leads to an emotional experience renders the experience, at bottom, “cognitive.”99
That is, for Professor Nussbaum, the visceral reaction Elster explained as showing that not all emotions have cognitive antecedents
in fact shows that emotions are “cognitive.”100
97. NUSSBAUM, UPHEAVALS OF THOUGHT , supra note 4, at 37. This summary of Nussbaum’s work, of course, drastically simplifies her analysis, but, I think, accurately characterizes her claim that emotions are at bottom “cognitive.”
98. See Ellsworth & Scherer, supra note 92.
99. NUSSBAUM, UPHEAVALS OF THOUGHT, supra note 4, at 4 (explicating her theory of
emotions as, in part, suggesting that an emotion contains a “cognitive appraisal or evaluation” (emphasis omitted)); id. at 114 (suggesting that “the transmission of information”
along certain neural pathways (even pathways that bypass areas of conscious judgment)
suggests a cognitive basis for that theory of emotions). It is possible this is simply a matter
of semantics: James Averill, whom Nussbaum cites approvingly, id. at 151 n.20, has elsewhere distinguished two meanings of “cognition.” See James R. Averill, Emotions as Episodic Dispositions, Cognitive Schemas, and Transitory Social Roles: Steps Toward an Integrated Theory of Emotion, in 3a PERSPECTIVES IN PERSONALITY: SELF AND EMOTION 139,
143-45 (D.J. Ozer et al. eds., 1990). The first is “intellective knowledge acquisition,” the
conventional lay definition of cognition. Emotions are noncognitive under that view; that
is, they are more value-laden, intuitive, and irrational. Emotions are “cognitive” in a second, broader, sense, under Averill’s second definition (which may be similar to Nussbaum’s)—“any nonbehavioral mental activity.” They are thus “cognitive” in the sense of being “mental processes.” See SUSAN T. FISKE & SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION 455
(2d ed. 1991).
100. Professor Nussbaum’s approach illustrates a tendency in legal discussions of the
emotions to view them not only as conscious, but also as under conscious supervision or
management of cognition. See Blumenthal, supra note 2, at 25-27 (noting this difficulty);
Blumenthal, Affective Forecasting, supra note 4, at 161-62 (noting the same). A recent review of her work makes this point. Peter H. Huang & Christopher J. Anderson, A Psychology of Emotional Legal Decision Making: Revulsion and Saving Face in Legal Theory and
Practice, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1045, 1058 (2006) (reviewing MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, HIDING
FROM HUMANITY: DISGUST, SHAME, AND THE LAW (2004)) (noting that Professor Nussbaum
“does not address” in her book “the fact that disgust, like many emotions, is usually automatic and unconscious”). Others have noted the management issue as well. E.g., JOSEPH
LEDOUX, THE EMOTIONAL BRAIN: THE MYSTERIOUS UNDERPINNINGS OF EMOTIONAL LIFE
19 (1996) (“While conscious control over emotions is weak, emotions can flood consciousness. This is so because the wiring of the brain at this point in our evolutionary history is
such that connections from the emotional systems to the cognitive systems are stronger
than connections from the cognitive systems to the emotional systems.”); Seymour Epstein
& Rosemary Pacini, Some Basic Issues Regarding Dual-Process Theories from the Perspective of Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory, in DUAL-PROCESS THEORIES IN SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 462, 475 (Shelly Chaiken & Yaacov Trope eds., 1999) (noting data “uniformly
[showing] a direct influence of the [emotional] on the rational system, but not the reverse”);
Don A. Moore & George Loewenstein, Self-Interest, Automaticity, and the Psychology of
Conflict of Interest, 17 SOC. JUST. RES. 189, 192 (2004) (“ ‘[W]here [conscious] thought conflicts with emotions, the latter is designed by the neural circuitry in our brains to win’ ”
(quoting RITA CARTER, MAPPING THE MIND 54 (1998))).
Another of Professor Elster’s examples illustrates this conscious/unconscious distinction.
He discusses Norwegian workers in different industries: aluminum, fishing, and textile. In
the former two, workers receive indirect wage subsidies; textiles workers receive direct

2007]

EMOTIONAL PATERNALISM

21

Again, legal discussion of emotion often relies on Elster’s and
Nussbaum’s work.101 Thus, to the extent that their approaches frame
emotion as primarily conscious and cognitive, the legal discussion
suffers too. For instance, Professor Sunstein’s book review of Paul
Slovic’s volume on fear and the perception of risk was sharply criticized as overcognitivizing the emotion of fear, reducing it solely to
the cognitive evaluation of risky outcomes.102 Whether or not the
criticism accurately portrayed Sunstein’s discussion,103 fear clearly
cannot be merely such cognitive evaluation, as there are any number
of varieties of that emotion. The fear one experiences when considering a nuclear power plant mishap is almost certainly different,
physiologically and phenomenologically, from the fear one might experience over being caught cheating on an exam, or over receiving a
low grade on that exam.104 And again, Joseph LeDoux’s work demonwage subsidies. Elster argues that textiles workers feel envy for those working in the other
two industries; those others, he implies, are proud not to be taking handouts, even though
it is clear that their wages are being subsidized. He concludes that because the circumstances are framed differently—indirect versus direct subsidies—the emotions generated
by the two situations are different: pride and shame. See ELSTER, supra note 4, at 252-53.
It is not clear, however, whether what the aluminum and fishing workers feel in reacting
to the thought of the subsidies is in fact pride. It seems equally plausible that they recognize that they too are receiving subsidies from the government and are ashamed, but reconstrue the situation to put a positive spin on it. In both cases, what is felt is shame. See
id. at 252 (“[A]ccepting wage subsidies is perceived to be like begging.”). The other workers
are conscious of that shame, though, and take steps to reframe the situation into one in
which shame is less warranted (i.e., indirect versus direct subsidy).
The point is important. For the aluminum and fishing workers, it is not necessarily the
case that their initial emotional reaction is pride. Indeed, it is likely that they, like the textile workers, initially feel shame. In a deliberate attempt to feel better, however, they try
to “manage their feelings.” When an emotional experience and its cause are brought to conscious awareness and there is time and ability to do so—which is not always the case—
managing may be more possible. It is not the case, however, that emotions can be managed
as easily as some commentators imply. Cf. Blumenthal, supra note 2, at 26 & n.189; Brian
Rosebury, On Punishing Emotions, 16 RATIO JURIS 37, 43 (2003) (suggesting that certain
psychological precursors of emotional judgments are “far less amenable . . . to conscious
supervision”).
101. See supra note 4 and the sources cited supra note 90.
102. Moran, supra note 86, at 1-2.
103. Elsewhere, for instance, Professor Sunstein suggests that “[i]n the domain of
risks, and most other places, emotional reactions are usually based on thinking; they are
hardly cognition-free.” Sunstein, supra note 7, at 66. Moran is thus correct to suggest that
Sunstein only “briefly touches on the biological foundation of fear and its relationship to
higher cortical processes,” framing “emotion almost exclusively in relation to cognition.”
Moran, supra note 86, at 4. Sunstein has elsewhere noted, however, that “ ‘affect’ [seems to
come before risk or benefit assessments], and helps to ‘direct’ judgments of both risk and
benefit.” Cass R. Sunstein, Moral Heuristics and Moral Framing, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1556,
1564 (2004). He has also acknowledged the broader literature, for example, infra note 111,
demonstrating that emotional responses often precede cognitive. Sunstein, Moral Heuristics and Moral Framing, supra, at 1563. (“A great deal of recent attention has been paid to
the fact that people often have a rapid, largely affective response to objects and situations,
including job applicants, consumer products, animals, cars, and causes of action.”). But cf.
infra note 105 (suggesting that in his other work, Professor Sunstein is less clear).
104. Cf. Zajonc, supra note 92, at 601.
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strates physiological triggers of fear reactions even before cognitive
or perceptual identification of the fear stimulus.105 Conversely of
course, the perception of risk need not involve a fearful reaction or
evaluation,106 even though affect might be at the base of many judgments about emotionally-laden risky events.107
It is clear that there is some interaction and even integration between the cognitive or rational system and the emotional or experiential system. But it is just as clear that what we refer to as emotions are distinct from rational or cognitive judgments and decisions—physiologically and phenomenologically, a “hot” state characterized by the experience of emotion is different from a “cold” state,
characterized by calm, cool, dispassionate, rational judgment.108 Substantial empirical evidence demonstrates the “independence of affect
from cognition,”109 and, more importantly, the very different behavior
to which the two states can lead.110 Similar to the neurological evidence above, a variety of empirical studies demonstrates “affect primacy,” showing that an emotional state precedes and orients a cognitive state, often entirely outside of consciousness.111 Additional evidence stems from the clear effect that incidental moods can have on
105. LEDOUX, supra note 100. Sunstein acknowledges this work. Sunstein, supra note
11, at 1140 n.90 and accompanying text; Sunstein, supra note 7, at 66 n.27 (“[S]ome types
of emotions . . . can be triggered before the more cognitive sectors become involved at all.”).
He continues without explanation in the latter, though, “[i]t is not true, however, that fear
in human beings is generally precognitive or noncognitive, and even if it is in some cases, it
is not clear that noncognitive fear would be triggered by most of the risks faced in everyday
human lives.” Id. at 66 n.27. But cf. Sunstein, supra note 103, at 1564 (“ ‘[A]ffect’ [seems to
come before risk or benefit assessments], and helps to ‘direct’ judgments of both risk and
benefit.”).
106. E.g., Michael A. McCann, Economic Efficiency and Consumer Choice Theory in
Nutritional Labeling, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 1161 (documenting erroneous public perception of
the health risks of eating fast food, though not in the context of emotional decisionmaking).
107. George F. Loewenstein et al., Risk as Feelings, 127 PSYCHOL. BULL. 267 (2001).
108. Cf. Rottenstreich & Shu, supra note 4, at 458-59 (alluding to Loewenstein et al.’s
work, supra note 107, to suggest that “[a]n extreme interpretation of [that research] would
imply that there are two separate systems – an affective system and a perhaps more cognitive system”).
109. Paul Slovic et al., The Affect Heuristic, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT, supra note 3, at 397, 401. Psychologist Robert Zajonc has suggested fourteen fundamental differences between the two domains, including
emotions’ cultural universality; the limited number of distinct emotions (as compared to an
infinite number of distinct cognitions); the physiological primacy of emotional reactions;
and the suggestion that cognitions are always “about something,” whereas emotions can
exist without a direct referent (e.g., “free-floating anxiety”). Zajonc, supra note 92, at 59697. Jaak Panksepp, another leading emotion psychologist, also identifies several distinctions between affective and cognitive processes. Jaak Panksepp, At the Interface of the Affective, Behavioral, and Cognitive Neurosciences: Decoding the Emotional Feelings of the
Brain, 52 BRAIN & COGNITION 4 (2003).
110. E.g., Loewenstein et al., supra note 107, at 267 (“[Empirical data] show that emotional reactions to risky situations often diverge from cognitive assessments of those risks.
When such divergence occurs, emotional reactions often drive behavior.”). See supra note
100; infra Part III.C.
111. See generally Zajonc, supra note 92; Zajonc, supra note 96.
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judgments and decisionmaking. A vast empirical literature demonstrates such effect on numerous social judgments, including legal and
moral decisions.112 Finally, striking evidence for two phenomenologically distinct systems comes from empirical studies showing that due
to emotion and “gut” feelings, people behave as though certain lowprobability events are less probable when represented by equivalent
ratios of smaller numbers (1 in 10) than of larger numbers (10 in
100).113 That is, people saw the likelihood of Event X as greater when
the probability was expressed as a 10 in 100 chance than when it was
expressed as 1 in 10, and behaved accordingly. Even more striking,
people behaved similarly when the other ratio for Event X ranged between 5 and 9 in 100.114 That is, despite objective information that
Event X had, for instance, a 7 out of 100 chance of occurring versus a
1 in 10 chance, respondents chose and behaved as though the former
were more likely. Respondents explained that rationally and objectively, they understood that the likelihood was lower; emotionally
and subjectively, however, they felt they had a better chance when
the absolute likelihood appeared higher (i.e., 7 chances rather than
1), and thus actually chose as though they had a better chance of obtaining X under those circumstances.115 Moreover, this tendency to
respond nonoptimally was correlated with increased real-life gambling behavior.

112. For sources reviewing the extensive empirical data on the influence of incidental
mood on other social and interpersonal judgments, see sources cited supra note 5. For experimental evidence of incidental mood’s influence on moral judgments, see Blumenthal,
Mood and Moral Judgment, supra note 4 (collecting studies and reporting new data).
113. E.g., Lee A. Kirkpatrick & Seymour Epstein, Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory
and Subjective Probability: Further Evidence for Two Conceptual Systems, 63 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 534 (1992).
114. Veronika Denes-Raj & Seymour Epstein, Conflict Between Intuitive and Rational
Processing: When People Behave Against Their Better Judgment, 66 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 819, 821-23 (1994); see Epstein & Pacini, supra note 100, at 466. In the DenesRaj and Epstein experiment, subjects were presented with two rectangular platters of colored jellybeans. The small platter always contained 1 red and 9 white jellybeans; the large
platter contained between 5 and 9 red jellybeans, and the remainder white to total 100.
Denes-Raj & Epstein, supra, at 821. Subjects were instructed that by picking a red jellybean they would either win $1.00 (win trial) or lose $1.00 (lose trial). Though each platter
was clearly labeled with the relevant proportion, such knowledge had little effect on many
respondents’ behavior.
There may be a connection between these findings and empirical research on the effect of
framing a question as involving either frequencies (e.g., 10 out of 100) or probabilities (e.g.,
10%), although the possibility has to my knowledge not been investigated. The different
framing may affect the perception of the likelihood involved by influencing the associated
emotional reaction. See, e.g., Paul Slovic et al., Violence Risk Assessment and Risk Communication: The Effects of Using Actual Cases, Providing Instruction, and Employing
Probability Versus Frequency Formats, 24 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 271 (2000).
115. Denes-Raj & Epstein, supra note 114, at 823; Epstein & Pacini, supra note 100, at
466.
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At bottom, I do not at all want to argue that there is a clearly demarcated break between cognition and emotion.116 But there are important differences between emotion and cognition that have consequences for paternalistic intervention. First and most important,
people clearly behave differently when in “hot” and “cold” states, and
even as the result of feelings they recognize as irrational. Second,
emotion does have cognitive elements, in the sense of appraisals and
identification of stimuli. But emotional reactions can often be
quicker, outside consciousness, more automatic, less analytic, and
less controllable, and need not always include such appraisal. The
manageability of emotions may therefore be different than that of
cognition.117
B. Cognitive Biases and Implications for Paternalism
Most of the previous discussion of paternalism and social science
has thus been in the context of cognitive biases, the traditional line of
heuristics and biases that affect judgments and decisionmaking.118
Commentators have cited a number of these biases as potentially, or
actually, warranting third-party intervention in the decisionmaking
process in order to protect individuals from such poor judgments. For
instance, Sunstein discusses the “availability heuristic,” which leads
individuals to mispredict the frequency or likelihood of easily imagined events, because the ease with which such an example is generated leads one to believe that it is common or likely.119 At a general
level, he suggests that:
[a]n understanding of [this] heuristic bears directly on the debate
over paternalistic interventions. If people believe that some risks
are much higher than they actually are and that other risks are
much lower than they actually are, their behavior will not promote
their welfare. People will take excessive precautions to avoid trivial risks and they will fail to protect themselves against genuine
hazards. Government has a legitimate role to play here; at a
minimum, it should correct false beliefs. In some cases, government legitimately responds to people’s inability to process risk116. Indeed, I have suggested elsewhere that too sharp a distinction can be misleading.
Blumenthal, supra note 2, at 25.
117. Of course, there is more automatic, less conscious cognition as well. See, e.g.,
Daniel M. Wegner & John A. Bargh, Control and Automaticity in Social Life, in HANDBOOK
OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 92, at 446; Daniel T. Gilbert et al., On Cognitive Busyness: When Person Perceivers Meet Persons Perceived, 54 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
733 (1988).
118. Rachlinski, Uncertain Psychological Case, supra note 9, gives a good review, from
which I draw here.
119. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and
Biases, 185 SCI. 1124, 1127 (1974) (identifying and explaining the availability heuristic);
Jolls et al., supra note 3, at 1477 (“[T]he frequency of some event is estimated by judging
how easy it is to recall other instances of this type . . . .”).
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related information by constraining their choices, at least when
the constraint ensures that they will do what they would do if they
were adequately informed.120

More specifically, the availability heuristic may lead to investors’
overreliance on media reports of atypical investor success, and a belief that such success is there for the taking.121 Such “irrational exuberance,” to coin a cliché, may warrant third-party intervention to
dampen investors’ ardor.122 Similarly, because breach of contract
tends overall to be atypical, contracting parties might be vulnerable
to the heuristic and mispredict the likelihood of breach (either overestimating or underestimating), leading some commentators to suggest intervention.123 In quite another context, Elizabeth Scott has
suggested that the availability heuristic is “the type of cognitive error
most likely to distort premarital decisions,” and is therefore one justification for developing precommitment strategies for individuals considering marriage.124
Other cognitive biases have also led to calls for third-party intervention to protect individuals from their own decisionmaking. The

120. Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Available? Social Influences and Behavioral Economics,
97 NW. U. L. REV. 1295, 1302-03 (2003); cf. Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 60-62 (1995).
121. Henry T. C. Hu, Illiteracy and Intervention: Wholesale Derivatives, Retail Mutual
Funds, and the Matter of Asset Class, 84 GEO. L.J. 2319, 2369 (1996).
122. Id. (recommending government and/or regulatory intervention to remedy irrational investment tendencies).
123. One commentator condones judicial reluctance to enforce liquidated damages
clauses, in part because of the availability heuristic. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Emergence of Dynamic Contract Law, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1743, 1784 (2000). Eisenberg suggests, in
part, that the typical absence of breach leads contracting parties to view contract fulfillment as the most available, and thus likely, outcome; therefore, the party will only underestimate the likelihood of a liquidated damages clause coming into play and therefore not
fully evaluate the clause. See id. Indeed, one scholar suggests that courts behave so in any
case. Robert A. Hillman, The Limits of Behavioral Decision Theory in Legal Analysis: The
Case of Liquidated Damages, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 717, 735 (2000). In contrast, another author suggests that recent experience with a breach will lead a contracting party to overpredict that likelihood in the present contract, leading the author to emphasize “supracompensatory” (i.e., liquidated or punitive) damages as a remedy. Larry A. DiMatteo, A
Theory of Efficient Penalty: Eliminating the Law of Liquidated Damages, 38 AM. BUS. L.J.
633, 705 (2001).
124. Elizabeth S. Scott, Rational Decisionmaking About Marriage and Divorce, 76 VA.
L. REV. 9, 63-64 (1990). Interestingly, Professor Scott frames the decisions about marriage
and divorce as subject to cognitive errors such as the availability heuristic and cognitive
dissonance, rather than emotional factors. She explicitly notes that these cognitive biases
will only influence decisionmaking to the extent the decision process “is influenced by a
calculation of costs.” Id. at 44. Thus, she suggests, “[I]f the decision is based primarily on
emotional impulse, then precommitment mechanisms would not function as predicted.” Id.
at 44 n.98. Professor Scott suggests that research from social psychology lends support to
the notion that calculation of costs is involved in some of the relevant decisionmaking. Id.
at 48 (“There is consensus that the individual considering divorce usually undertakes a
cost-benefit calculation, comparing continued marriage with divorce.”).
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“hindsight bias”125 may lead investors to overweight stocks’ past performance in predicting future performance, leading to poor investment decisions;126 again, such tendencies may warrant intervention
into investors’ decisionmaking.127 The false consensus effect, or the
tendency to project one’s own beliefs, attitudes, and character traits
onto others, may lead to trust in inappropriate circumstances; for instance, an honest individual’s likelihood to enter into an unfair contract because he simply assumes that the other party is equally
trustworthy.128 Many such cognitive biases with the potential to lead
to manipulated and/or inefficient contracts have led commentators to
recommend stricter guidelines on who may enter into what contracts
on which terms—approving of, or recommending more, paternalistic
oversight of the market.129
Finally, overoptimism could lead to inaccurate perception of various risks or skills: drivers may neglect to wear seat belts or motorcycle helmets, for instance, due to inflated views of their own driving
skills; such inaccurate perceptions might plausibly lead to paternal-

125. Baruch Fischhoff, Hindsight ≠ Foresight: The Effect of Outcome Knowledge on
Judgment Under Uncertainty, 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 288 (1975) (documenting
bias). The bias is notoriously difficult to avoid or to correct. E.g., Scott A. Hawkins & Reid
Hastie, Hindsight: Biased Judgments of Past Events After the Outcomes Are Known, 107
PSYCHOL. BULL. 311 (1990) (discussing difficulty of avoiding hindsight bias ); Kim A.
Kamin & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Ex Post ≠ Ex Ante: Determining Liability in Hindsight, 19
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 89 (1995) (empirically demonstrating the difficulty of avoiding and
correcting bias); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 571, 586-88 (1998) (discussing difficulty of correcting hindsight
bias). As sketched below, however, doing so is not impossible. See infra note 296.
126. Stephen J. Choi, Promoting Issuer Choice in Securities Regulation, 41 VA. J. INT’L
L. 815, 844 n.105 (2001) (“[I]nvestors may act with ‘hindsight bias,’ placing too much
weight on past performance in projecting future performance.”). Nominally, Professor Choi
makes this point in the context of arguments against investor regulation. Id. at 843-44.
However, he points out that the danger of cognitive biases exists under the current, nonregulated regulatory system, and that the sort of regulation he proposes may help counter
such biases. Id. at 844.
127. See supra notes 121-22. Note that this is different from the much more common
instances where documenting the hindsight bias calls for limits on judges’ or juries’ decisionmaking. E.g., Hal R. Arkes & Cindy A. Schipani, Medical Malpractice v. the Business
Judgment Rule: Differences in Hindsight Bias, 73 OR. L. REV. 587, 630 (1994) (suggesting a
bifurcated trial); Jolls et al., supra note 3, at 1527 (suggesting manipulation of the information given to jurors); Rachlinski, supra note 125, at 606 (suggesting changing the standard of proof). There, under my present definition, such limits are not “paternalistic,” as
they do not directly protect an individual from her own biased decisions; rather, they protect a defendant or the integrity of the judicial process from such biases. Cf. Blumenthal,
Affective Forecasting, supra note 4, at 235 (making this distinction more generally).
128. E.g., Robert Prentice, Contract-Based Defenses in Securities Fraud Litigation: A
Behavioral Analysis, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 337, 365 (using this example as one of several
demonstrating importance of emphasizing tort-based regulation of securities fraud, rather
than contract-based).
129. E.g., Stephen Choi, Regulating Investors Not Issuers: A Market-Based Proposal, 88
CAL. L. REV. 279, 300 (2000) (suggesting, in part based on discussion of cognitive errors,
regulating access to investments).
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istic intervention such as the installation of air bags regardless of the
consumer’s wishes.130
Again, these are simply selected examples of cognitive biases identified by social scientists that have encouraged legal commentators in
a number of contexts to make policy recommendations designed to
protect individuals from the consequences of those biases. Emotional
biases, however, have been discussed in less depth in the legal paternalism context; the next section begins to address that gap.
C. Emotional Biases and Implications for Paternalism
1. Framework and Distinctions
Low-level, basic emotions are essential, adaptive, rapid, and efficient. An important function is to orient us toward dangerous or
other personally salient stimuli.131 Sometimes, however, such orientation leads to mistakenly identifying that salient stimulus as dangerous, under an evolutionarily adaptive “better-safe-than-sorry” approach. When that happens, an individual avoids something that
might be beneficial, thus reducing welfare. Moreover, “free-floating”
or incidental affect—affect unrelated to a judgment or decision at
hand—can sometimes bias a decision or decisionmaking process.132
Emotion related to or evoked by a particular stimulus may also affect
judgments and decisions relating to it. For all of these reasons, emotions are “a potential source of biased judgment and reckless action.”133 In this section I review some of the affective (emotional) biases that empirical research has identified, connecting them to legal
and policy circumstances and highlighting the potential each raises
for paternalistic intervention.134
Three distinctions will be especially relevant in this discussion.
First, I distinguish between judgments and decisions involving (or
130. E.g., Thomas S. Ulen, The Growing Pains of Behavioral Law and Economics, 51
VAND. L. REV. 1747, 1753 (1998) (noting that where failure to wear seat belts stems from
cognitive limitations, “an appropriate social corrective may take the decision about safety
restraints out of the hands of the drivers and passengers and mandate the installation of
passive restraints (such as air bags) that operate independently of any judgment made by
those in the motor vehicle”).
131. Jorge L. Armony et al., Computational Modeling of Emotion: Explorations
Through the Anatomy and Physiology of Fear Conditioning, 1 TRENDS IN COGNITIVE SCI.
28, 33 (1997); Loewenstein et al., supra note 107, at 268.
132. See sources cited supra note 5.
133. George F. Loewenstein & Jennifer S. Lerner, The Role of Affect in Decision Making, in HANDBOOK OF AFFECTIVE SCIENCES, supra note 4, at 619, 620.
134. In some instances, law and policy have already “intervened,” recognizing, for instance, the usefulness of “cooling-off periods.” See Camerer et al., supra note 9, at 1238-47
(discussing such interventions); infra Part IV.B.3 (evaluating effectiveness of cooling-off
periods). Similarly, in limited circumstances courts have recognized the difficulty of foreseeing future emotions. See Blumenthal, Affective Forecasting, supra note 4, at 209-14 (discussing surrogate mothering contracts).
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based on, or predicting) emotions or emotional reactions,135 and ones
influenced by emotions at the time of judgment or decision.136 This
distinction connects closely with the question of intervening to correct emotional biases: as discussed more fully in Part IV.B, one (difficult) way to alleviate cognitive biases—for some people, for some
judgments, and in some circumstances137—is to draw an individual’s
attention to the potential bias.138 The evidence is less clear for emotional biases, but it seems as though such intervention would succeed
differently for the two sorts of judgments—less successful for ones
involving or predicting emotions, more so for ones made under the influence of some affect.
Second, a useful distinction may be drawn between emotional biases stemming from active manipulation by others and ones resulting from the simple operation of biases and heuristics.139 Some cases
of emotional bias—in the realms of consumer decisions, family planning, or politics—reflect efforts to deliberately manipulate decisions
by inducing emotions/moods that the manipulator hopes will bias decisionmaking.140 Other cases, though, involve natural biases or er135. For instance, general judgments about expected utility, consumer judgments
about preferences, or predictions of emotion to be experienced—“affective forecasting.” See
Blumenthal, Affective Forecasting, supra note 4.
136. For instance, the influence of concurrently experienced mood that is nevertheless
unrelated to the judgment at hand. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 5. The distinction is
similar to that made recently by George Loewenstein and colleagues between “expected”
and “immediate” emotions, and their similar distinction between “anticipated” and “anticipatory” emotions. For the distinction between expected and immediate emotions, see
Loewenstein & Lerner, supra note 133, at 620. For the similar distinction between anticipated and anticipatory emotions, see Loewenstein et al., supra note 107, at 267-68. The
first in each of Loewenstein’s pairs are emotions that are predicted to occur in the future,
typically as the consequence of some decision outcome. The second reflects the influence of
affect experienced concurrently with the decision or judgment being made and would include both those incidental mood effects noted above and effects stemming from emotion
related to the judgment task.
137. The existence of individual differences in cognitive and emotional biases has led to
some contention in the academic discussion. Compare Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and
Economics’ Perfect Rationality Should Not Be Traded for Behavioral Law and Economics’
Equal Incompetence, 91 GEO. L.J. 67 (2002) (suggesting that individual differences in susceptibility to such biases lessens the usefulness of behavioral law and economics’ policy
suggestions), with Prentice, supra note 2, at 1722-44 (countering Mitchell’s criticisms). See
also Blumenthal, supra note 2, at 28-30 (discussing implications of individual differences
for legal policy); Rachlinski, Cognitive Errors, supra note 9 (discussing implications of individual differences for paternalistic policies).
138. Infra Part IV.B.
139. Paul Slovic et al., Rational Actors or Rational Fools: Implications of the Affect
Heuristic for Behavioral Economics, 31 J. SOCIO-ECON. 329, 337 (2002).
140. E.g., Blumenthal, Abortion, Persuasion, and Emotion, supra note 22 (noting potential for emotional manipulation in context of abortion decisionmaking); Jon D. Hanson
& Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some Evidence of Market Manipulation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1420, 1444 (1999) (“ ‘[Atmospheric] factors . . . may be designed
into or manipulated within retail spaces in order to produce emotional and, in turn, behavioral effects in consumers.’ ” (quoting GORDON R. FOXALL & RONALD E. GOLDSMITH,
CONSUMER PSYCHOLOGY FOR MARKETING 189 (1994)); Marrow, supra note 43, at 26-34
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rors, such as the tendency to make different judgments or evaluations when in a good mood versus a bad mood.141 Obviously the first
is designed to capitalize on the second, but distinguishing them may
suggest different views on the propriety of paternalism. People are
likely more receptive to paternalistic policies designed to protect
against one party taking advantage of another’s tendencies toward
emotional bias, such as advertisers’ manipulation of emotion or unconscionable contract practices. However, people are likely less receptive to policies designed to guard against their own, especially unconscious, biases, seeing such policies as more intrusive than the
former. Moreover, different policies or interventions—for instance, ex
ante versus ex post—may be warranted depending on which sort of
bias is to be corrected, and those different interventions may themselves be differently successful. For instance, ex ante intervention
may be appropriate for naturally occurring biases, but these may be
less successful than ex post intervention, such as by a court.
Third, for a number of empirical reasons, it is useful to distinguish between positive and negative emotions, as well as among different types of positive and negative emotions.142 Emotional processes, and thus the biases they may cause or be involved with, seem
to differ based on the emotion’s valence. For instance, people are
relatively inaccurate at predicting the intensity and duration of their
emotional reactions to future events.143 However, people are actually
better at predicting reactions to positive experiences than to negative
ones (or, at least, not as inaccurate).144 On the other hand, when we
do make mistakes regarding future reactions to positive events (e.g.,
overestimating how much utility we will derive from such an event),
we are not likely to learn from those mistakes;145 but it is not clear
(identifying instances of contractual manipulation by taking advantage of cognitive and affective or “experiential” factors, although the discussion is primarily framed in terms of
cognitive biases); Paul Bennett Marrow, The Unconscionability of a Liquidated Damages
Clause: A Practical Application of Behavioral Decision Theory, 22 PACE L. REV. 27, 90-95
(2001) (containing a similar discussion); Daniel N. Shaviro, Exchange on Public Choice, 57
U. CHI. L. REV. 834, 836 (1990) (commenting on the article by Herbert Hovenkamp, Legislation, Well-Being, and Public Choice, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 63 (1990), and noting the ability
of “politicians to manipulate [voters] with potent emotional symbols (ranging from race to
‘competitiveness’ to the flag) that often are only weakly related to underlying substance”);
Note, In Vitro Fertilization: Insurance and Consumer Protection, 109 HARV. L. REV. 2092,
2102 (1996) (“Consumers in the market for infertility treatment may be especially vulnerable to emotional manipulation . . . .”).
141. See infra Part III.C.2.
142. Most discussion of law and the emotions has focused on negative emotions. See
George Loewenstein, Emotions in Economic Theory and Economic Behavior, 90 AM. ECON.
REV. 426, 426 n.1 (2000).
143. See Blumenthal, Affective Forecasting, supra note 4.
144. Daniel T. Gilbert et al., Immune Neglect: A Source of Durability Bias in Affective
Forecasting, 75 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 617, 626 (1998).
145. See Timothy D. Wilson et al., Lessons from the Past: Do People Learn From Experience that Emotional Reactions are Short-Lived?, 27 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
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whether we learn from erroneous predictions about negative emotions.146 In other contexts, it appears that some corrective measures
(again, such as drawing an individual’s attention to her current
mood) may be differentially successful for positive and negative mood
biases.147 More broadly, it has long been known that people in positive and negative moods process information differently, are differently persuadable, and articulate different attitudes, beliefs, and
opinions.148 Accordingly, in developing interventions, we may need to
take into account different effects of positive and negative emotional
contexts.149
2. Types of Emotional Biases
The distinctions sketched above illustrate that applying empirical
research to the paternalism question is more nuanced than previous
discussions might suggest. The following discussion identifies a
number of emotional biases, using these distinctions as an organizing
BULL. 1648 (2001); see also Norbert Schwarz, Emotion, Cognition, and Decision Making, 14
COGNITION & EMOTION 433, 437 (2000) (“Given individuals’ general difficulties with the
prediction of future feelings, one may hope that extensive experience with an affecteliciting situation would increase the validity of predictions pertaining to future similar
situations. Unfortunately, this hope is unwarranted . . . and memories of past feelings are
themselves subject to systematic biases.”).
146. Wilson et al., supra note 145, at 1650.
147. See Gerald J. Gorn et al., Mood, Awareness, and Product Evaluation, 2 J.
CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 237 (1993) (drawing attention to mood state corrects bias for positive
but not negative moods); Norbert Schwarz & Gerald Clore, Mood, Misattribution, and
Judgments of Well-Being: Informative and Directive Functions of Affective States, 45 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 513 (1983) (showing an opposite pattern).
148. See Blumenthal, supra note 2, at 50 (citing sources).
149. Similarly, we should distinguish within positive and negative emotions, that is,
among different kinds of each. Traditionally, emotion research focused broadly on the effects of positive versus negative emotion. But increasingly, evidence shows that different
emotions of the same valence can have quite different effects on cognitive processes. See
David DeSteno et al., Beyond Valence in the Perception of Likelihood: The Role of Emotion
Specificity, 78 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 397 (2000); Jennifer S. Lerner & Dacher
Keltner, Beyond Valence: Toward a Model of Emotion-Specific Influences on Judgement
and Choice, 14 COGNITION & EMOTION 473, 474-76 (2000); Larissa Z. Tiedens & Susan Linton, Judgment Under Emotional Certainty and Uncertainty: The Effects of Specific Emotions on Information Processing, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 973 (2001). The
negative emotions of fear, anger, sadness, and anxiety, for instance, can all lead to different risk perceptions, different likelihood estimates, and different influences of emotion.
See, e.g., Jennifer S. Lerner & Dacher Keltner, Fear, Anger, and Risk, 81 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 146 (2001). And, of course, emotions of the same valence differ in their
physiology, e.g., Robert W. Levenson, Autonomic Nervous System Differences Among Emotions, 3 PSYCHOL. SCI. 23 (1992), and their phenomenology. These differences show that
care need be taken in applying empirical emotion research to law and policy, as findings
from some studies may not generalize to the legal context in question. Peter H. Huang,
Moody Investing and the Supreme Court: Rethinking the Materiality of Information and the
Reasonableness of Investors, 13 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 99, 130 (2005) (“[I]n light of the finding that affective states of the same valence have distinct, predictable influences on persuasion, decision making, and motivation, how should the legal system account for specific
emotions?”).
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framework. Specifically, in sections (a) and (b), I identify biases involving judgment about emotions and biases resulting from the influence of concurrently experienced emotion. In section (c) I briefly
note the likelihood that detrimental decisionmaking based on such
judgments may easily stem from the manipulation by others of the
biases documented. For each example, I sketch some suggestions
that have been or could be made for paternalistic interventions; both
here and in the next Part, I address the potential success of such
policies.
(a) Biases Involving Judgments About Emotions
i) Affective Forecasting
Surprisingly, although people are fairly good at predicting the valence of our future emotions, we are actually quite inaccurate when
asked to predict the intensity and the duration of the emotional reaction.150 In part this is because our predictions are often about unfamiliar events; and in part it is because we simply do not consider aspects of both ourselves and the outside world that, over time, tend to
ameliorate the intensity and duration of emotional reactions. Susceptibility to such prediction errors has implications for medical decisionmaking,151 jury decisionmaking,152 contract law,153 negotiation,154
tax policy,155 surrogate mothering,156 custody and use of frozen embryos,157 risk and other regulation,158 and other contexts.

150. See generally Blumenthal, Affective Forecasting, supra note 4; see also Chris
Guthrie, Better Settle Than Sorry: The Regret Aversion Theory of Litigation Behavior, 1999
U. ILL. L. REV. 43, 85-86 (noting individuals’ inability to predict how they will feel in the
future); Chris Guthrie & David Sally, The Impact of the Impact Bias on Negotiation, 87
MARQ. L. REV. 817, 818-19 (2004) (recognizing social science literature on affective forecasting); Mark Kelman, Law and Behavioral Science: Conceptual Overviews, 97 NW. U. L.
REV. 1347, 1356 (2003) (“Consider also the important point made by behavioral social scientists who investigate hedonics: individuals invariably make concrete choices and establish short-term behavioral plans in expectation that the choices they make will make them
happier than the ones they forego, but they may for a variety of reasons know very little
about what has made them happy or will make them happy.”); George Loewenstein &
David Schkade, Wouldn’t It Be Nice? Predicting Future Feelings, in WELL-BEING: THE
FOUNDATIONS OF HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY 85 (Daniel Kahneman et al., eds., 1999); Leaf Van
Boven & Joanne Kane, Predicting Feelings Versus Choices, in JUDGMENTS OVER TIME: THE
INTERPLAY OF THOUGHTS, FEELINGS, AND BEHAVIORS 67 (Lawrence J. Sanna & Edward C.
Chang eds., 2006) (reviewing such research).
151. E.g., Blumenthal, Affective Forecasting, supra note 4, at 217-25.
152. Id. at 182-92 (discussing how prediction errors influence jury decisionmaking
within various contexts).
153. Id. at 214 (discussing how prediction errors affect contract duties and liabilities).
154. Guthrie & Sally, supra note 150, at 821-27.
155. See Diane M. Ring, Why Happiness?: A Commentary on Griffith’s Progressive
Taxation and Happiness, 45 B.C. L. REV. 1413 (2004).
156. Blumenthal, Affective Forecasting, supra note 4, at 209-14; Margaret Jane Radin,
Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1934 (1987) (“[P]erformance of surrogacy
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In some of these legal and policy contexts, paternalism might be
involved when a third party needs to intervene in order to privilege
one set of an individual’s preferences (Time1) or the other (Time2), or
in order to protect an individual from the nonoptimal consequences
to which biased decisionmaking might lead. Perhaps an obvious application is legislation outlawing suicide or limiting or prohibiting
requests for euthanasia, based on observations by policymakers that
individuals’ preferences for such steps are likely to be emotionally biased.159 On the other hand, such research may also point to a decreased need for paternalistic steps. For instance, Chris Guthrie has
noted the relevance of affective forecasting research to governmental
regulatory action in anticipation of some possible negative event (for
example, terrorism or epidemics). He suggests that because actual
harms may be less than anticipated harms, government infringement on autonomy, liberty, and other rights may be less warranted
than it at first appears.160 Further, government intervention to protect against decisionmaking biases might be less warranted if the actual harms that ensue from the biases are less than might be anticipated.
A more speculative context involves the emerging discussion of
memory- and emotion-dampening drugs.161 Pharmacological research
demonstrates that the drug propranolol can, in part, decrease the intensity of emotions associated with particular events.162 These findings may make those who have experienced traumatic events interested in taking propranolol, with the goal of “therapeutic forgetting.”
In a recent article, Adam Kolber discusses several of the legal and
ethical issues arising from the possibility of such induced forgetting,
addressing as well responses by the Presidential Council on Bioethics
that were largely antipathetic to its use. Relevant here are a number
of concerns by the Council, summarized by Professor Kolber as follows: memory dampening may “(1) prevent us from truly coming to
terms with trauma, (2) tamper with our identities, leading us to a
false sense of happiness, (3) demean the genuineness of human life
and experience, (4) encourage us to forget memories that we are obligated to keep, and (5) inure us to the pain of others.”163 Although the
agreements by willing parties should be permitted, but women who change their minds
should not be forced to perform.”).
157. Blumenthal, Affective Forecasting, supra note 4, at 215-17.
158. E.g., Chris Guthrie, Risk Realization, Emotion, and Policy Making, 69 MO. L. REV.
1039 (2004) (discussing how predictive errors put policy makers in an awkward position).
159. Cf. Blumenthal, Affective Forecasting, supra note 4, at 217-22 (discussing applications of affective forecasting research to euthanasia and advance directives).
160. Guthrie, supra note 158, at 1044-45.
161. See Adam J. Kolber, Therapeutic Forgetting: The Legal and Ethical Implications
of Memory Dampening, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1561 (2006).
162. Id. at 1574-77.
163. Id. at 1565-66.
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Council did not directly call for prohibitions on the use of propranolol
for therapeutic forgetting, these concerns demonstrate a clear skepticism and at least the potential for future attempts at paternalistic
regulation.
Errors in affective forecasting are relevant to such a discussion.
Again, individuals typically mispredict their future emotional reactions, typically overestimating the intensity and duration of those
emotional states; such mispredictions are typically stronger for negative emotions than for positive. And again, in part this is because we
underestimate our ability to cope with traumatic events. To the extent that this is so, the demand for memory dampening might be too
high; people may overestimate the need to forget negative emotions
by underestimating the degree to which those emotions will dissipate
naturally over time.164 The Council or other government actors might
seek to use the affective forecasting research as a basis for paternalistically regulating the use of propranolol, in an effort to overcome
arguments such as Professor Kolber’s that are based, in part, on
autonomy.165
ii) The Endowment Effect
The endowment effect (EE), or the tendency to experience a
“warm glow of ownership” and value a good or entitlement more
highly when it is possessed, is a robust effect considered to significantly undercut basic assumptions of law and economics.166 Traditional law and economics predicts that an individual’s willingness to
pay for a good should match her willingness to sell that good, and
thus that the asking price and offer price should match. This prediction reflects basic assumptions underlying the Coase Theorem as
well.167 Nevertheless, the prediction has been shown false in a number of experimental and real-life settings; the price that individuals
tend to demand to sell a good that they own is significantly higher

164. I do not discuss the application to those suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), which Professor Kolber discusses as a potential use for therapeutic forgetting. The affective forecasting literature has focused primarily on “healthy” subjects, that
is, not on those suffering diagnosed disorders. Professor Kolber does address some of these
issues. See, e.g., Kolber, supra note 161, at 1567-71.
165. Id. at 1566-67 (suggesting that the Council’s arguments provide relatively weak
grounds for wide-ranging legal restrictions on memory dampening and do not justify a
broad legal restriction on the use of memory-dampening drugs and that “heavy-handed
government prohibition of memory dampening is inappropriate”). I do not take a stand on
the issue, but rather note the potential for paternalism raised by the convergence of the affective forecasting research and Professor Kolber’s discussion of therapeutic forgetting.
166. Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the
Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325, 1326-29 (1990).
167. Id.
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than the amount they would be willing to offer to buy it.168 The effect
is generally attributed to “loss aversion,” where to lose something of
a given magnitude causes a larger decrease in utility than the increase in utility that gaining a good of that magnitude would
cause.169
This effect—considered by some the most important empirical
contribution that behavioral law and economics has made170—stems
in large part from emotional, as opposed to cognitive, factors. A recent review of why the EE occurs emphasized four potential explanations, all with emotional underpinnings: (1) “pure” loss aversion,
where to lose something “simply hurts more” than not receiving it—
an illogical bias that simply reflects “difference[s] in emotional content;” (2) “attachment,” where simply owning an entitlement adds
value, sentimental or otherwise, over and above the entitlement’s
pure “commodity status;” (3) a “regret avoidance” hypothesis, reflecting the notion that “giving up an entitlement is more likely to cause
future regret than not obtaining an entitlement;” and (4) the “disutility” of selling, where simply participating in a sale of the entitlement causes dysphoria, especially when that sale involves inappropriately commodifying that entitlement.171 As an empirical matter,
such reluctance to commodify, or preference for nonfungible possessions, does seem to underlie many of the EE findings: two recent
meta-analytic reviews of EE studies demonstrated that the less a
possession is like an “ordinary market good,” the more likely it is
that the EE will occur.172 Recent experimental research lends further

168. Id. For reviews of studies, see John K. Horowitz & Kenneth E. McConnell, A Review of WTA / WTP Studies, 44 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 426 (2002) (reviewing forty-five
studies); Serdar Sayman & Ayşe Öncüler, Effects of Study Design Characteristics on the
WTA-WTP Disparity: A Meta Analytical Framework, 26 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 289 (2005) (reviewing thirty-nine studies).
169. Kahneman et al., supra note 166, at 1326-27; Russell Korobkin, The Endowment
Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1227, 1250 (2003); Leaf Van Boven et al.,
Egocentric Empathy Gaps Between Owners and Buyers: Misperceptions of the Endowment
Effect, 79 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 66, 66 (2000).
170. E.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Can There Be a Behavioral Law and Economics?, 51
VAND. L. REV. 1729, 1735 (1998); Korobkin, supra note 169, at 1229.
171. Id. at 1250-55.
172. Horowitz & McConnell, supra note 168, at 427 (reviewing forty-five studies and
finding that EE is highest for nonmarket goods and lowest for various forms of money,
with “ordinary private goods” falling somewhere in between); Sayman & Öncüler, supra
note 168, at 304 tbl.2 (reviewing thirty-nine studies and finding that similarity of good to
“market good” was negatively correlated with strength of EE, and “perceived illegitimacy”
of transaction was positively correlated with strength of EE); see also Kahneman et al., supra note 166, at 1344 (noting that EE reflects an unwillingness to sell, but little unwillingness to buy, suggesting that what is involved is parting with a good, rather than with
money). More precisely, the meta-analyses reviewed studies examining the disparity between the willingness to pay for a good or entitlement and the willingness to accept some
compensation for that same good or entitlement. The endowment effect reflects that disparity. See, e.g., id. at 1342 (“The endowment effect is one explanation for the systematic
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credence to the role of emotional reactions or regret avoidance in the
EE, finding a correlation between the perceived “importance” of a
possession and the degree of loss aversion.173 Because potential market participants’ EE or disparity between willingness to pay and willingness to accept leads to undertrading and thus likely market inefficiencies, third-party intervention to attenuate the effect might be appropriate.174
Alternatively, intervention might be designed (in good faith or
not) in order to take advantage of the EE. Good faith intervenors
might provide goods to individuals precisely because their initial
preferences will be changed once they own that good.175 The obverse,
a less innocuous step, might be to provide individuals with a good
less valuable than they might deserve or desire, under the assumption that through the EE and other mechanisms they will come to
value it more.176
Note that an underexplored issue, amenable to empirical investigation, involves the interaction between these two emotional effects:
affective forecasting and the endowment effect. For instance, is the
pain of losing an owned good (or the utility of maintaining possession) less than we anticipate?177 Furthermore, if we realized this, how
might it affect our selling price? To what extent, then, might educational intervention attenuate the endowment effect?
iii) Probability Neglect
As noted above in Part III.A, Seymour Epstein and colleagues
have documented differences between what they call the “cognitive”
system (rational maximizing analysis) and the “experiential” system
(intuitive, emotional analysis). In particular, they noted the differences in judgment and behavior to which the two systems can lead,
and the likelihood of nonoptimal outcomes when the latter system is
used.178 Substantial other empirical evidence shows probability neglect—when a judgment about the outcome of a particular action is
differences between buying and selling prices that have been observed so often in past
work.”).
173. See Eric J. Johnson et al., Exploring the Nature of Loss Aversion 23-24 (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
174. Sunstein, supra note 49, at 1172 (arguing that the endowment effect and related
biases may support “considerable legislative and judicial intrusion into private preference
structures”).
175. Id. at 1152.
176. Or, “the legal system might remove goods from someone who currently has them,
even if that person values those goods, in the expectation that he might not miss them after they have been taken.” Id.
177. For some such research, see George Loewenstein & Daniel Adler, A Bias in the
Prediction of Tastes, 105 ECON. J. 929 (1995).
178. See Denes-Raj & Epstein, supra note 114; Epstein & Pacini, supra note 100;
Kirkpatrick & Epstein, supra note 113.
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accompanied by strong emotion, or is otherwise heavily affect-laden,
people’s decisions about those outcomes are relatively impervious to
changes in the probability of the outcome.179 Traditional expectedutility theory predicts that decisions should be relatively sensitive to
outcome probability—that is, the utility of a particular outcome
should be weighted by the likelihood that it will occur. The data,
however, show that when an outcome is emotionally-laden, and especially when that outcome is vivid or made especially salient, people
are highly insensitive to variations in probability.
In one study, for instance, subjects were asked to report the highest amount of money that they would pay to avoid a particular unpleasant outcome that occurred with varying degrees of likelihood.180
The unpleasant outcome was either fairly neutral (the loss of $20) or
vividly unpleasant (a brief but painful electrical shock). Subjects presented with varying possibilities of a $20 loss varied relatively predictably with the likelihood of the loss: for a 1% chance they were
willing to pay a maximum of $1; for a 99% chance they would pay up
to $18. To avoid the shock, however, the maximum subjects would
pay rose only from $7 (for a 1% chance of shock) to $10 (for a 99%
chance).181 Whatever one might say about the subjects’ perceptions of
those outcomes, it is clear that the impact of probability depended on
the nature of the outcome. People seem to be willing to pay significant amounts to avoid emotionally unpleasant outcomes, but the
amount they will pay does not seem to vary much as the probability
increases. Refining these findings in more recent research, Hsee and
Rottenstreich show that in nonemotional states—that is, when people focus on more rational calculation—people are relatively more
sensitive to changes in probabilities or scope, consistent with expected utility theory.182 According to Hsee and Rottenstreich, under
emotional states, probabilities also matter, but only at the extremes;
that is, people are sensitive to the presence or absence of the possibility (that is, a change from 0% to some small percentage or, with less
conclusive support, from a large percentage to certainty), but not at
levels in between.183 Epstein’s findings, however, show that even such
explicit attention to calculation does not always alleviate the shortcomings of experiential decisionmaking: recall the individuals who
179. See Loewenstein et al., supra note 107, at 276-78; Sunstein, supra note 7, at 67.
180. Yuval Rottenstreich & Christopher K. Hsee, Money, Kisses, and Electric Shocks:
On the Affective Psychology of Risk, 12 PSYCHOL. SCI. 185, 188 (1999).
181. Id.
182. That is, focusing on more formulaic analysis of value, taking into account both the
nature and the scope of a stimulus, rather than determining preference simply by evaluating one’s feelings toward that stimulus. See Christopher K. Hsee & Yuval Rottenstreich,
Music, Pandas, and Muggers: On the Affective Psychology of Value, 133 J. EXPERIMENTAL
PSYCHOL.: GEN. 23, 23-24 (2004).
183. Id. at 28.
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insisted that they had a “better” chance of a favorable decision outcome when their chances of success were 7 out of 100 than 1 out of
10.184
Professor Sunstein illustrates legal and policy implications of this
bias, suggesting that “the demand for legal intervention can be
greatly affected by probability neglect, so that government may end
up engaging in extensive regulation precisely because intense emotional reactions are making people relatively insensitive to the (low)
probability that the relevant dangers will ever come to fruition.”185 In
areas of administrative law, jury decisionmaking, regulatory legislation, and others, he notes the difficulties and implications involved in
developing third-party interventions, ultimately recommending “information and education,” along with cost-benefit analysis of proposed interventions if stronger measures become necessary.186 As I
discuss below, however, “information and education” are not always
effective remedies for bias.187
(b) Biases Involving Immediate or Incidental Emotions
The biases above involve judgments about emotionally-laden
events or tasks. But emotion and mood also directly influence ordinary decisionmaking when decisions or judgments are made while in
an emotional state. This is especially so when the affective state is
triggered by a stimulus unrelated to the target of the task at hand.
i) Affect Infusion
A substantial body of empirical research shows that both decisions
and decisionmaking processes can be influenced by emotions at the
time of judgment or decision.188 In some cases the emotion will be
elicited by the decision at hand or circumstances surrounding it—for
instance, juries swayed by compassion elicited by victim impact
statements or by disgust induced by gruesome photographs placed
into evidence.189 In other instances—equally, if not more interest184. Denes-Raj & Epstein, supra note 114, at 821-22.
185. Sunstein, supra note 7, at 68.
186. Id. at 106-07.
187. See infra Part IV.B.
188. See Shelly Chaiken, The Heuristic Model of Persuasion, in SOCIAL INFLUENCE:
THE ONTARIO SYMPOSIUM, VOLUME 5, 3 (Mark P. Zanna et al. eds., 1987) (identifying effects of incidental mood on persuasion); Schwarz, supra note 145, at 433-34 (collecting
studies); see also supra note 5 (listing sources).
189. For studies examining the impact of gruesome photographs see, for example,
David A. Bright & Jane Goodman-Delahunty, Gruesome Evidence and Emotion: Anger,
Blame, and Jury Decision-making, 30 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 183 (2006) (showing impact of
gruesome photographs on mock jurors’ emotional responses and on verdicts); Kevin S.
Douglas et al., The Impact of Graphic Photographic Evidence on Mock Jurors’ Decisions in
a Murder Trial: Probative or Prejudicial?, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 485, 499-500 (1997)
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ing—the emotion (or mood) will be incidental to the decision but nevertheless influences it.190
These effects manifest in a number of ways. Mood-congruent
memories are more easily retrieved than memories incongruent with
one’s current emotional state.191 Mood-congruent judgments are often
made via a “how-do-I-feel-about-it” heuristic, with individuals in
positive moods evaluating a target more favorably than those in
negative moods.192 Mood can affect perceptions of mood-congruent
probabilities, with people in positive moods predicting a higher likelihood of positive events or outcomes than of negative ones.193 And
one of the most robust findings in the emotions literature is the effect
mood has on processing strategy—in particular, how deeply a person
processes information. Broadly speaking, individuals in positive
moods tend to process information more superficially or heuristically,
tend to rely more on stereotypes, and are more easily persuaded than
individuals in negative moods.194 These mood effects—also called “affect infusion,” as the decisionmaking process becomes “infused” with
the unrelated mood being experienced195—can depend on the sort of
judgment being made. Briefly (and perhaps counterintuitively), when
a judgment is more constructive, entailing more effort and processing, affect infusion is more likely (probably because there is more
processing going on for mood to become involved in).196 In contrast,

(finding that photographs influenced verdicts even though mock jurors thought they
should not and did not). For victim impact research see, for example, Edith Greene, The
Many Guises of Victim Impact Evidence and Effects on Jurors’ Judgments, 5 PSYCHOL.,
CRIME & L. 331 (1999); James Luginbuhl & Michael Burkhead, Victim Impact Evidence in
a Capital Trial: Encouraging Votes for Death, 20 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 1 (1995); Bryan Myers
et al., Victim Impact Testimony and Juror Judgments: The Effects of Harm Information
and Witness Demeanor, 32 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 2393 (2002); see generally Jean M.
Callihan, Victim Impact Statements in Capital Trials: A Selected Bibliography, 88
CORNELL L. REV. 569, 573-74 (2003) (listing studies).
190. See generally supra note 5 (listing sources).
191. E.g., Henry C. Ellis & Brent A. Moore, Mood and Memory, in HANDBOOK OF
COGNITION AND EMOTION 193 (Tim Dalgleish & Mick J. Power eds., 1999); Klaus Fiedler et
al., Is Mood Congruency an Effect of Genuine Memory or Response Bias?, 37 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 201, 201 (2001).
192. See, e.g., Schwarz, supra note 5; Norbert Schwarz & Gerald L. Clore, How Do I
Feel About It? The Informative Function of Affective States, in AFFECT, COGNITION AND
SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: NEW EVIDENCE AND INTEGRATIVE ATTEMPTS 44 (Klaus Fiedler & Joseph
Forgas eds., 1988).
193. See, e.g., Thomas E. Nygren et al., The Influence of Positive Affect on the Decision
Rule in Risk Situations: Focus on Outcome (and Especially Avoidance of Loss) Rather Than
Probability, 66 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 59 (1996).
194. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. Note, though, that consistent with the
distinction made above, such results can differ depending on which negative mood is induced. See, e.g., Schwarz, supra note 145, at 434; Tiedens & Linton, supra note 149, at 97374.
195. See Joseph P. Forgas, Affective Influences on Attitudes and Judgments, in
HANDBOOK OF AFFECTIVE SCIENCES, supra note 4, at 596, 612.
196. Id. at 612-13.
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when a judgment involves the simple retrieval of existing, especially
“crystallized” knowledge or attitudes (a simpler process), then affect
infusion is less likely.197 Understanding that a potential emotional
bias may depend on the decision task at hand helps determine
whether and when corrective intervention may be relevant.198
Judgments and decisionmaking may be influenced by incidental
mood, but examples also abound of mood influencing behaviors relevant to paternalism—both self- and other-related. For instance,
women dieters (“restrained eaters”) who watched film clips inducing
both positive and negative emotions tended to eat more while watching the clips, demonstrating that such emotional arousal somehow
disinhibited women’s food-related restraint.199 Positive mood unrelated to the substance of negotiations can lead to more cooperative
strategies and, by some criteria, more successful negotiations.200
Negative mood usually (but not necessarily) leads to less helping behavior than positive mood.201 Relatedly, decisionmakers charged with
distributive welfare tasks can be subject to mood effects; induced
empathy can lead to increased and objectively unfair shares of allocated goods.202 And directly relevant to employment and other sorts
of discrimination, individuals in a positive mood are more likely to
use stereotypes in judging others.203 Some interventions might be
197. Id. at 612.
198. Blumenthal, Mood and Moral Judgment, supra note 4, at 14-17 (documenting the
impact of immediate, incidental mood on moral judgments). There I suggest that at first
blush, such findings may indicate strong paternalistic policies such as requiring voters to
watch a particular mood-inducing movie before voting (or, analogously, require jurors to
watch some such video before their verdict), in order to avoid superficial decisionmaking.
Id. at 23. I note, however, that the fact that voting often consists of simply acting on established, crystallized judgments meets this proposal. Id. at 23-24; Blumenthal, supra note 2,
at 50-51.
199. E.g., Joseph Cools et al., Emotional Arousal and Overeating in Restrained Eaters,
101 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 348 (1992) (documenting that both positive and negative emotional arousal triggered overeating in restrained eaters); David E. Schotte et al., FilmInduced Negative Affect Triggers Overeating in Restrained Eaters, 99 J. ABNORMAL
PSYCHOL. 317 (1990) (discussing how negative emotional arousal triggered overeating in
restrained eaters); cf. Laurette Dubé et al., Affect Asymmetry and Comfort Food Consumption, 86 PHYSIOLOGY & BEHAV. 559, 560 (2005) (documenting that positive emotional states
lead to comfort food consumption for men and negative emotional states lead to comfort
food consumption for women).
200. Joseph P. Forgas, On Feeling Good and Getting Your Way: Mood Effects on Negotiator Cognition and Bargaining Strategies, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 565, 56667 (1998). Note that this is different from more common examples of emotion that stem
from the bargaining itself having an influence on the process and substance of negotiations.
201. See Blumenthal, Mood and Moral Judgment, supra note 4, at 4-5 nn.21-22 (citing
studies).
202. E.g., C. Daniel Batson et al., Immorality from Empathy-Induced Altruism: When
Compassion and Justice Conflict, 68 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1042, 1042 (1995).
203. Andrea Abele et al., Positive Mood and In-Group—Out-Group Differentiation in a
Minimal Group Setting, 24 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1343, 1343 (1998); Herbert Bless et al., Mood and the Impact of Category Membership and Individuating Infor-
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geared toward ameliorating such mood effects; these might simply
involve drawing attention to the relevant mood. That is, research
shows that incidental mood can affect judgments through the “howdo-I-feel-about-it” heuristic, where an existing mood is used as a
proxy for one’s feelings toward or judgments about a target.204 When
an individual is made aware of that incidental mood, its relevance as
a proxy is removed and, at least in theory, the individual can then
make unbiased judgments.205 In practice, however, as discussed more
fully in Part IV, such corrections are not always effective and, as
with many debiasing efforts, can in fact be counterproductive, due to
overcorrection, rebound effects, or other concerns.
Other interventions might take advantage of the bias—for instance, by encouraging or even mandating people to engage in mental or physical activities that elevate mood (such as meditation or
physical exercise) in order to reap the welfare benefits of being in a
positive mood.206 Scholars and policymakers are beginning to discuss
this sort of “positive paternalism.”207
ii) Risk Perception
As alluded to earlier, immediately experienced emotions—positive
or negative—can bias people’s perceptions of risk, including judgments of the likelihood of risky events. The absence of emotional experience can do so as well. Mid-twentieth century neurosurgeons, for
mation, 26 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 935, 936 (1996); Galen V. Bodenhausen et al., Happiness
and Stereotypic Thinking in Social Judgment, 66 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 621
(1994). Even this can depend on the specific emotion; some negative emotions (such as anger or anxiety) in fact increase the use of stereotypes, while others (such as sadness) decrease it. See Galen V. Bodenhausen et al., Negative Affect and Social Judgment: The Differential Impact of Anger and Sadness, 24 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 45 (1994); Dacher Keltner et al., Beyond Simple Pessimism: Effects of Sadness and Anger on Social Perception, 64
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 740 (1993); Rajagopal Raghunathan & Michel Tuan
Pham, All Negative Moods Are Not Equal: Motivational Influences of Anxiety and Sadness
on Decision Making, 79 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 56 (1999).
204. See, e.g., supra note 192 and accompanying text.
205. See, e.g., Schwarz & Clore, supra note 147.
206. I thank Chris Guthrie for pointing out this possibility, though I do not know
whether he would endorse it. A potential difficulty, however, as sketched further below, is
the loss of judgmental benefits of being in a negative mood: recall that some such moods
can in fact improve some judgment accuracy, reduce the use of stereotypes, etc. See supra
note 194 and accompanying text.
207. See Huang & Blumenthal, Positive Law and Policy, supra note 32; Huang & Blumenthal, Positive Policy/Positive Institutions, supra note 32; Kathryn Abrams & Hila
Keren, Law in the Cultivation of Hope, 95 CAL. L. REV. 319 (2007). At least one expert in
emotion research has noted, though not in a paternalism context, the potential usefulness
of “field experiments [testing] the psychological, social, and physical outcomes of interventions aimed at cultivating positive emotions in daily life.” Barbara L. Fredrickson, Positive
Emotions, in HANDBOOK OF POSITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 120, 131 (C.R. Snyder & Shane J. Lopez
eds., 2002). Some such research exists. See generally Martin E.P. Seligman et al., Positive
Psychology Progress: Empirical Validation of Interventions, 60 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 410
(2005) (reviewing recent developments in the field of positive psychology).
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instance, found that patients who underwent frontal lobotomies—an
operation removing much of the areas apparently necessary for imagining the emotional effect of future outcomes—seemed to be more
impulsive than others and more prone to risk taking.208 More recently, Damasio and colleagues have identified patients suffering
from damage to high-level cortical areas involving emotion who,
though understanding the probabilities involved in gambling games
presented to them, nevertheless tended to make risky decisions and
go bankrupt more often than nondamaged patients.209
When emotions are present, whether related or unrelated to the
judgment at hand, the dynamics of actual affective influence are
somewhat complex. Initial research on unrelated affect showed a
tendency for mood-congruent judgments; individuals induced to feel
negative affect made more pessimistic estimates about frequencies of
death, for instance, than those placed in a positive mood. That research also showed that people in positive moods tended to be more
optimistic, overestimating the likelihood of positive events and underestimating that of negative events.210 On the other hand, those
same happy people tended to be more cautious or conservative than
others in actual gambling or other risk-based behavior, especially
when there was a risk of large or even moderate loss.211 Further research in this line showed that negative moods can also lead to biased perceptions of risk.212 But negative moods can do so in a variety
of ways. For instance, fear can lead to pessimistic risk estimates and
risk-averse choices, while anger can lead to more optimistic estimates and risk-seeking choices.213

208. WALTER FREEMAN & JAMES W. WATTS, PSYCHOSURGERY: INTELLIGENCE, EMOTION
SOCIAL BEHAVIOR FOLLOWING PREFRONTAL LOBOTOMY FOR MENTAL DISORDERS 303
(1942).
209. See, e.g., Antoine Bechara et al., Deciding Advantageously Before Knowing the Advantageous Strategy, 275 SCI. 1293 (1997).
210. See Eric J. Johnson & Amos Tversky, Affect, Generalization, and the Perception of
Risk, 45 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 20 (1983); John D. Mayer et al., MoodCongruent Judgment is a General Effect, 63 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 119 (1992).
Relatedly, a “wishful thinking” phenomenon, similar to an optimism bias, has long been
documented, in which desired or desirable events are considered more likely. See Douglas
McGregor, The Major Determinants of the Prediction of Social Events, 33 J. ABNORMAL &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 179 (1938).
211. See Hal R. Arkes et al., The Role of Potential Loss in the Influence of Affect on
Risk-Taking Behavior, 42 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 181
(1988); Alice M. Isen et al., Influence of Positive Affect on the Subjective Utility of Gains
and Losses: It Is Just Not Worth the Risk, 55 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 710 (1988);
Alice M. Isen & Robert Patrick, The Effect of Positive Feeling on Risk-Taking: When the
Chips are Down, 31 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. PERFORMANCE 194 (1983).
212. See, e.g., Johnson & Tversky, supra note 210; William F. Wright & Gordon H.
Bower; Mood Effects on Subjective Probability Assessment, 52 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. &
HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 276 (1992).
213. Lerner & Keltner, supra note 149, at 480-87.
AND
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As Professor Sunstein suggests, when emotions are related to the
risk judgment at hand, the emotion-inducing “vivid images and concrete pictures of disaster can ‘crowd out’ other kinds of thoughts, including the crucial thought that the probability of disaster is very
small.”214 All of these emotionally driven misperceptions of risk may
warrant intervention in order to key legislative action to the actual,
not the perceived, risk.215 And in the context of emotional judgments,
there is some empirical justification for such intervention: specifically, predictions of others’ risk preferences—in which we ordinarily
see others as more risk-seeking—are actually more accurate when
the target of prediction is vivid.216
Much previous discussion on public perception (and misperception) of risk has focused on cognitive biases such as the availability
bias.217 However, the possibility that emotion has a stronger effect
than cognition on perceptions of risk may lead to different approaches to policy intervention. The literature has also constrained
itself to broad, valence-based framing of emotion, without differentiating among similarly valenced emotions. Making such distinctions
can help identify appropriate interventions.
iii) Hot/Cold Empathy Gaps
Related to the affective forecasting literature,218 substantial research has identified “hot/cold empathy gaps,” that is, the (fairly intuitive) tendency for people in an emotional state to make inaccurate
predictions about how they would behave when in a nonemotional
state (and vice versa). In a classic study, for instance, women who
one month before giving birth strongly disapproved of the use of anesthesia during delivery—and who repeated such preferences even
during early labor—nevertheless changed those attitudes during ac-

214. Sunstein, supra note 7, at 82.
215. Amitai Aviram discusses an important related aspect of such intervention, the
“placebo effect” of legislation. See Amitai Aviram, The Placebo Effect of Law: Law’s Role in
Manipulating Perceptions, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 54 (2006). There, the issue is legislative
action that is paternalistic in the sense of changing public perception about, for instance,
the risk of disaster, even though the legislation might be primarily or even wholly symbolic
(that is, the legislation may not affect the actual risk). Id. His discussion is largely framed
in cognitive terms.
216. Christopher K. Hsee & Elke U. Weber, A Fundamental Prediction Error: SelfOthers Discrepancies in Risk Preference, 126 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: GEN. 45 (1997).
Vividness here meant that the predictor could see the target about whose risk preferences
predictions were being made, even when the predictor did not know or interact with the
target. Id.
217. See, e.g., Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683 (1999).
218. See supra Part III.C.2.a.i.
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tive labor and requested anesthesia.219 In other research, male study
subjects who were sexually aroused predicted behaving in a more
sexually aggressive way in dating scenarios and reported a higher
likelihood of engaging in unsafe sex than nonaroused subjects.220
Without providing proof of behavior, these latter findings are consistent with the idea that nonaroused (“cold”) subjects inaccurately
imagine how they might behave when aroused.221 Similarly, these
empathy gaps have also been found to be relevant to the likelihood of
certain sexual behavior, including the probability that teenagers222 or
gay men223 would use contraceptives in sexual situations. As another
example, drug addicts who abstain from drugs for a period of time
may overestimate their resistance to relapse. Even a small amount of
drug use can easily lead to even more craving and to relapse.224 A
number of creative and interesting suggestions have been made recently to address such emotionally-based, time-inconsistent preferences, including smoking licenses,225 suicide “notification” practices,226 or various forms of “cooling off.”227
Each such suggestion, of course, involves some level of paternalism, though many of these authors are at pains to minimize the paternalistic nature of the intervention. One set of commentators more
219. See Jay J.J. Christensen-Szalanski, Discount Functions and the Measurement of
Patients’ Values: Women’s Decisions During Child Birth, 4 MED. DECISION MAKING 47
(1984).
220. See Dan Ariely & George Loewenstein, The Heat of the Moment: The Effect of Sexual Arousal on Sexual Decision Making, 19 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 87 (2006); George
Loewenstein et al., The Effect of Sexual Arousal on Expectations of Sexual Forcefulness, 34
J. RES. IN CRIME & DELINQUENCY 443 (1997).
221. See Van Boven & Kane, supra note 150 (reviewing substantial research showing
that individuals in an unaroused emotional state overestimate the influence of affective
factors).
222. See, e.g., George Loewenstein & Frank Furstenberg, Is Teenage Sexual Behavior
Rational?, 21 J. APP. SOC. PSYCHOL. 957 (1991).
223. Ron S. Gold, On the Need to Mind the Gap: On-Line Versus Off-Line Cognitions
Underlying Sexual Risk-Taking, in THE THEORY OF REASONED ACTION: ITS APPLICATION TO
AIDS PREVENTIVE BEHAVIOR 227 (Deborah J. Terry et al. eds., 1993).
224. Eliot L. Gardner & Joyce H. Lowinson, Drug Craving and Positive/Negative Hedonic Brain Substrates Activated by Addicting Drugs, 5 SEMINARS IN THE NEUROSCIENCES
359 (1993).
225. See Lee Anne Fennell, Revealing Options, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1399, 1483 (2005)
(discussing smoking license proposal by Jay Bhattacharya and Darius Lakdawalla); cf.
Jonathan Gruber & Botond Köszegi, Is Addiction “Rational”? Theory and Evidence, 116 Q.
J. ECON. 1261 (2001) (developing optimal “sin tax” for smoking); Ted O’Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Studying Optimal Paternalism, Illustrated by a Model of Sin Taxes, 93 AM.
ECON. REV. 186 (2003) (discussing paternalistic policies in context of smoking).
226. Camerer et al., supra note 9, at 1245 (noting the possibility of requiring a suicidal
person to give one month’s notice of his intent).
227. Id. at 1245. Examples might be waiting periods before marriage or divorce. See
Kronman, supra note 18, at 796 (arguing for longer waiting periods before allowing divorce, in order to increase nonemotional decisionmaking); Scott, supra note 124, at 48
(suggesting that waiting periods would increase the likelihood of reconciliation). See infra
Part IV.B.3. (discussing cooling-off periods).
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open about the paternalistic nature of their suggestion are Professors
Ayres and Baker, who recently called for establishing a new crime of
“reckless sexual conduct”228:
Appreciating that men and women may underestimate the true
risks of unprotected first-time sexual encounters strengthens the
rationales for government intervention. Thus, our crime can be
justified now not only by the traditional “externalities” argument—men and women don’t take into account the harms to other
people when they engage in reckless sex—but also as a form of
cognitive “paternalism” aimed at increasing the perceived risk of
engaging in unprotected first-time sexual encounters.229

Similar to Professors Sunstein and Scott, however,230 they frame
their reasoning in cognitive, rather than emotional terms.
(c) Manipulation by Others
Private parties—firms, marketers, individuals—as well as governmental actors may seek to capitalize on any of the above naturally occurring emotional biases in order to further an agenda of
moneymaking or power.231 An important difference between the
negative consequences resulting from naturally occurring biases and
those from biases taken advantage of by others, private or public,
may be the public’s receptivity to the paternalistic policy that might
be proposed as a result. Voters are likely more receptive to policies
designed to protect themselves from manipulated decisions than to
policies perceived as more directly infringing on their own autonomous decisionmaking.232
228. Ian Ayres & Katharine K. Baker, A Separate Crime of Reckless Sex, 72 U. CHI. L.
REV. 599, 649-50 (2005). A person would be guilty of such crime if, in a first-time encounter
with another person, he or she had sexual intercourse without using a condom. Although
Ayres and Baker use gender neutral language in the definition, they suggest that the
likely disparate effect on men is justified, id. at 644-46, partly on paternalistic grounds, id.
at 646.
229. Id. at 649.
230. See supra note 86 (commenting on Sunstein’s cognitivism); supra note 124 (commenting on Scott’s cognitivism).
231. See Glaeser, supra note 9, at 155-56.
232. Compare Shapiro, supra note 16, at 530 (noting public reaction in Massachusetts
to mandatory seat belt laws—unwillingness to accept the proposed intervention “as a matter of principle”—due to perceived paternalistic nature of the law), with Michelle M. Mello
et al., The McLawsuit: The Fast-Food Industry and Legal Accountability for Obesity, 22
HEALTH AFFAIRS 207, 214 (2003) (“A recent public opinion poll suggests that Americans
are divided in their views about the role of government in combating obesity: 48 percent
feel that obesity is ‘a private issue that people need to deal with on their own,’ while 47
percent feel that it is ‘a public health issue that society needs to help solve.’ ” (footnote
omitted)). Professor Glaeser documents the decrease in smoking from 1964 to 2004, in part
due to soft paternalistic action by the government. Glaeser, supra note 9, at 153-54. He
also notes that “beliefs about the harmfulness of cigarettes have changed over time,” id. at
154, as have perceptions of cigarette companies’ manipulation, fraud, and deception, Mello
et al., supra, at 211-12. Together, such changing perceptions have led to acceptance of
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i) Securities Litigation
One commentator has recently suggested protecting investors by
revising the defenses afforded to those involved in securities litigation, in particular the defense of “puffery” and the “total mix” and
“bespeaks caution” doctrines, to better reflect investors’ actual decisionmaking.233 Specifically, Professor Huang suggests that courts
consider not only the cognitive impact that prospectuses or other informational material might have on potential investors and on
shareholders, but also the emotional impact.234 He notes that the
positive mood induced by “puffery” can lead to more superficial processing of a prospectus containing such puffery235 and recommends
that that mood be considered when evaluating how a “reasonable”
reader might interpret that material.236 Similarly, he suggests modifying the current “total mix” doctrine of evaluating the materiality of
information presented in investment material to include evaluation
of the total affect induced by that information.237 Taking such steps to
protect investors against their own emotional tendencies is one example of emotion data leading to paternalistic steps.
ii) Decisionmaking About Abortion
Another instance of the potential for manipulation by others involves the influence of emotion on a woman’s decisionmaking about
abortion. Because an abortion decision is so personal, often religious,
and (as a broad public issue) receives such publicity, it is of course a
highly emotional issue. But two other aspects of the decision, closely
related to each other, involve emotional influence that might lead to
paternalistic steps—albeit in different directions.
First, some research, though controversial, suggests that a small
percentage of women who elect an abortion later experience regret
and consequent poor mental health.238 Moreover, some groups of
women are more susceptible to such negative sequelae than others:
those who pursue abortion for reasons of birth defects in the fetus;239
harder legislative paternalism and increased liability for such companies. See Glaeser, supra note 9, at 154; see also, Mello et al., supra, at 212.
233. Huang, supra note 149, at 111-22.
234. Id. at 115.
235. See id. at 118.
236. See id. at 121.
237. See id. at 122.
238. See Nancy E. Adler et al., Psychological Factors in Abortion: A Review, 47 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 1194, 1198-1200 (1992) (discussing the relatively benign effects that abortion-electing women generally face, but also discussing factors that can lead to negative effects).
239. J. R. Ashton, The Psychosocial Outcome of Induced Abortion, 87 BRIT. J.
OBSTETRICS & GYNAECOLOGY 1115 (1980); Bruce D. Blumberg et al., Psychological Sequelae of Abortions Performed for a Genetic Indication, 122 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY
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younger women, as well as unmarried women without children;240
women who lack social support;241 and women who had previously
suffered some sort of emotional disturbance or psychological dysfunction.242 In some instances, these populations are in fact the ones more
likely to pursue abortions.243 Thus, although it is clear that most
women experience predominantly positive emotional responses after
abortion,244 a bias based on affective forecasting may afford the state
a justification for providing information about such negative sequelae. That is, although individuals are usually correct about the valence of future emotional reactions, predictions of intensity and duration are usually inaccurate.245 Assume a state does want to discourage women from having abortions. Relying on the affective forecasting literature, the state might seek to document a tendency for
women to underestimate the negative reaction they would have to
having chosen an abortion and, accordingly, argue that it is proper to
intervene to protect a woman who might be unduly optimistic. Thus,
state legislative paternalism might be involved here in trying to ensure that a woman has all the information necessary to make an informed decision—that is, protecting her from an emotional, putatively ill-informed decision. As much information as possible should
be given, the argument runs, to inform the woman of future potential
consequences, including future emotional consequences, to her.246
799 (1975); C.M. Friedman et al., The Decision-making Process and the Outcome of Therapeutic Abortion, 131 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1332 (1974).
240. Adler et al., supra note 238, at 1200. (“Younger and unmarried women without
children are relatively more likely than those who are older and who have already given
birth to experience negative responses.”).
241. See id. at 1201 (reviewing studies, but also suggesting that the link between social
support and postabortion emotions may be less clear than thought); see also Jeanette Martucci, Meta-Analysis: Psychsocial Predictors of Psychological Sequelae of Induced Abortion
57 (1998) (discussing the lack of perceived social support associated with poorer psychological adjustment) (unpublished dissertation, Miami Institute of Psychology of the Caribbean Center for the Advanced Studies) (on file with author).
242. Nancy Felipe Russo, Psychological Aspects of Unwanted Pregnancy and Its Resolution, in ABORTION, MEDICINE, AND THE LAW 593, 615 (J. Douglas Butler & David F. Walbert eds., 4th. ed. 1992) (noting that “history of emotional disturbance” is a “risk facto[r]
for negative emotional responses after abortion”).
243. See, e.g., Adler et al., supra note 238, at 1196 (noting that far more unmarried
women are abortion patients than married women, and that abortion patients tend to be
younger, most commonly 20-24 years old); see also PHYSICIANS FOR REPROD. CHOICE AND
HEALTH & THE GUTTMACHER INST., AN OVERVIEW OF ABORTION IN THE UNITED STATES 2425 (2006), http://www.guttmacher.org/presentations/abort_slides.pdf (showing that women
age 20-24 have the highest abortion rates, and that approximately 67% were never married).
244. Adler et al., supra note 238, at 1198, 1202; see also Martucci, supra note 241, at
58-59 (reporting lower depression and anxiety in women who had abortions relative to control groups).
245. Blumenthal, Affective Forecasting, supra note 4, at 166-67.
246. See, e.g., Robert D. Goldstein, Reading Casey: Structuring the Woman’s Decisionmaking Process, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 787, 813-15 (1996) (providing argument of hypothetical State Attorney General as to justifications for mandating such information).
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And such an approach is constitutional under existing doctrine.
Under Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, a
statute requiring informed consent does not qualify as an “undue
burden” on a woman seeking an abortion if the information is “truthful and not misleading.”247 This approach reshaped abortion jurisprudence, allowing states opposed to abortion to mandate various informed consent procedures under the guise of championing a
woman’s decisionmaking autonomy.248
But this leads to the second paternalism point, focusing on judicial rather than legislative paternalism: although the information
provided by the state under the guise of providing full and complete
information may be truthful, it may nevertheless still be misleading
under an approach similar to Professor Huang’s.249 Specifically, individuals hearing emotionally-laden communications eliciting fear or
anxiety may be more susceptible to persuasion by that message.250
State-provided information that focuses on explicit descriptions of
a developing fetus and/or the abortion procedure, or mandatory photographs or videos, may thus induce anxiety or fear to such a point
that decisionmaking is affected and a woman might come to a decision different from that which she might under a less emotional
judgment process. In such an instance, judicial intervention might be
appropriate in evaluating, on a case-by-case basis, whether the information provided may have burdened the woman’s decisionmaking
to such an extent as to render it unconstitutional.251
iii) Susceptibility to Advertising
There is little question that marketers are aware of, and make use
of, emotional influences on consumer behavior.252 From pleasant
247. 505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992).
248. See Blumenthal, Abortion, Persuasion, and Emotion, supra note 22; see also Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 961 (2000).
249. See Blumenthal, Abortion, Persuasion, and Emotion, supra note 22.
250. See id.; Sunstein, supra note 86, at 771 (“when people are anxious and fearful,
they are less likely to engage in systematic processing” and thus may be more easily persuaded); Sunstein, supra note 103, at 1565 (discussing the same); see also Richard E. Petty
et al., Multiple Roles for Affect in Persuasion, in EMOTION AND SOCIAL JUDGMENTS, supra
note 5, at 181, 183 (“[T]he most notable instances in which negative moods have produced
more favorable attitudes reside in the vast literature on fear appeals.”); Kim Witte, Putting
the Fear Back into Fear Appeals: The Extended Parallel Process Model, 59 COMM.
MONOGRAPHS 329 (1992).
251. This argument, including a critique of the former suggestion, is developed more
fully in Blumenthal, Abortion, Persuasion, and Emotion, supra note 22; cf. Glaeser, supra
note 9, at 135 (stating that “[g]overnments have a strong incentive to abuse any persuasion-related infrastructure”).
252. A full discussion of such machinations would move far beyond this paper’s scope.
For analysis, see, e.g., Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 732-33 (1999) [hereinafter Hanson & Kysar, The Problem of Market Manipulation] (noting use by marketers of
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aromas to sexy models to manipulative music, marketers seek to induce particular affective states in consumers. Their goal is to take
advantage of individuals’ tendencies to process more superficially
and engage in “splurchases” (spontaneous purchases) when in a positive mood,253 and to avoid such spontaneity and process more deeply
when in a negative mood.254 Similarly, marketers seek to capitalize
on risk- or thrill-seeking consumers’ emotional reactions to fast cars
and dangerous or “extreme” sports,255 as well as naturally-occurring
or marketer-created fears of physical or financial consequences.256
Those seeking to address such manipulation have suggested both
prospective and retrospective efforts. Hanson and Kysar, for instance, developed an extensive discussion of liability regimes that
might be imposed on market manipulators.257 Moreover, substantial
efforts have been made in a variety of contexts to educate consumers
about the effects of marketing ploys and both positive and negative
emotional appeals. As discussed more fully below, however, such
positive affect to influence and manipulate consumers’ perceptions); Hanson & Kysar, supra note 140 passim; Rachlinski, Cognitive Errors, supra note 9, at 228 (suggesting that
“spammers generally make offers that deliberately take advantage of people’s weaknesses
and fears”); Neal J. Roese, Counterfactual Thinking and Marketing: Introduction to the
Special Issue, 17 PSYCHOL. & MARKETING 277, 279 (2000) (“The manipulation of consumer
emotions by marketers has long been a staple of successful advertising.”); Eva Walther &
Sofia Grigoriadis, Why Sad People Like Shoes Better: The Influence of Mood on the Evaluative Conditioning of Consumer Attitudes, 21 PSYCHOL. & MARKETING 755 passim (2004);
Scot Silverglate, Comment, Subliminal Perception and the First Amendment: Yelling Fire
in a Crowded Mind?, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1243, 1262 (1990) (“Clever advertising executives appeal to a consumer’s emotional or psychological needs . . . .”); Note, Making Sense of
Hybrid Speech: A New Model for Commercial Speech and Expressive Conduct, 118 HARV. L.
REV. 2836, 2848 (2005) (“The external design of products often acts seductively on a consumer by tugging at his emotions (and with any luck, his wallet).”).
253. See Hanson & Kysar, supra note 140, at 1444-46; Sarah C. Haan, Note, The “Persuasion Route” of the Law: Advertising and Legal Persuasion, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1281,
1299-1300 (2000) (noting impact of positive affect and its relation to superficial processing).
254. See, e.g., Sharon E. Beatty & M. Elizabeth Ferrell, Impulse Buying: Modeling its
Precursors, 74 J. RETAILING 169 (1998) (noting that a negative mood seems to alleviate the
tendency to act on purchasing urges); Kordelia Spies et al., Store Atmosphere, Mood and
Purchasing Behavior, 14 INT’L J. RES. IN MARKETING 1, 11 tbl.7 (1997) (showing that shoppers experiencing a negative mood change spent less on spontaneous purchases than those
in positive mood); Patrick Van Kenhove & Patrick Desrumaux, The Relationship Between
Emotional States and Approach or Avoidance Responses in a Retail Environment, 7 INT’L
REV. RETAIL, DISTRIBUTION & CONSUMER RES. 351, 362-63 (1997) (consumers in negative
mood engaged in more avoidance than those in positive mood).
255. See, e.g., Hanson & Kysar, supra note 140, at 1461-62.
256. See, e.g., id. at 1462-66 (giving examples of advertising campaigns either capitalizing on or explicitly manipulating consumers’ fears); cf. Rachlinski, Cognitive Errors, supra
note 9, at 223 (“Advertising and marketing strategies that concern risky behavior (including financial decisions) commonly are directed carefully at specific demographic segments.”).
257. See generally Hanson & Kysar, The Problem of Market Manipulation, supra note
252; Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: A Response to
Market Manipulation, 6 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 259 (2000); Hanson & Kysar, supra
note 140.
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educational efforts are typically unsuccessful, and at times can be
counterproductive.258
iv) Contract Terms
As sketched above, Professors Korobkin and Marrow have each
discussed potential judicially paternalistic steps that might be taken
in the context of manipulative, and thus arguably unconscionable,
conduct in developing contract terms.259 Both reflect, to some extent,
the discussion in Part III.C.2.c.ii., above, of state manipulation of the
abortion decisionmaking process. Professor Korobkin’s discussion focused more on cognitive limitations of bounded rationality, indicating
the possibility for potentially positive paternalistic policies.260 Professor Marrow’s discussion takes a similar approach, focusing more on
emotional factors and reflecting Hanson and Kysar’s suggestions of
imposing liability. 261 For instance, he highlights the manipulation in
one-sided liquidated damages clauses in contracts for the provision of
emergency services, emphasizing the “experiential” or affective and
emotional influences that tend to “impede sound [rational] reasoning.”262 As a result of the potential for such manipulation, he encourages courts to expand unconscionability doctrine by developing the
tort of Consequential Procedural Unconscionability,263 which could
include efforts by a seller or provider who takes deliberate advantage
of known emotional biases to manipulate a potential buyer.
Although this tort has not taken hold doctrinally, courts somteimes do explicitly take into account the potential for emotional biases in evaluating the viability of contracts and contractual terms.
That is, in some circumstances judges may be more willing to step in
and overturn otherwise valid contracts. The clearest example involves courts’ evaluation of contracts for a surrogate mother’s services. Following the New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision in In re
Baby M.,264 emphasis is often placed on whether a contract allows the
surrogate mother to reverse her decision to relinquish the baby upon
birth.265 Whether the contract acknowledges the possibility that a
surrogate mother might change her mind based on the unpredicted
258. See infra Part IV.B.; cf. Hanson & Kysar, supra note 140, at 1447 (“Of course,
knowing of such [marketing] techniques does not necessarily render one immune to their
effects.”).
259. See Korobkin, supra note 9 and accompanying text; see also Marrow, supra note
43 and accompanying text.
260. See Korobkin, supra note 9 and accompanying text.
261. See Marrow, supra note 43.
262. Id. at 49 n.68.
263. Id. at 38 (identifying the tort of Consequential Procedural Unconscionability and
defining its elements).
264. 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
265. See Blumenthal, Affective Forecasting, supra note 4, at 209-14.
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emotions involved with pregnancy and childbirth thus plays an important role in determining that contract’s enforceability.266 This is
not to say that manipulation is necessarily involved, but it does reveal courts’ willingness to step in ex post to address a party’s
changed preferences.267
IV. EVALUATING INTERVENTIONS
A. Questions
The previous Part identified a number of emotional biases discussed in the social science literature that might detrimentally affect
individuals’ decisionmaking, and the potential need each bias raises
for some sort of intervention to reduce or eliminate it. I turn now to
empirical literature describing efforts to correct some of these biases,
mentioning possible governmental interventions that might reflect
such efforts. I discuss ways in which the biases above may play out in
real-life, law- and policy-based contexts.
A crucial question, of course, is an intervention’s potential effectiveness or success, especially in evaluating the costs involved.268
Thus, as I have suggested throughout, we must determine whether
any of these emotional biases can in fact be corrected; if so, can we
quantify, or at least roughly assess, the difficulty or costs of doing so?
Two discussions become important in this context. First, what sort of
interventions might be appropriate? Based on previous research,
there are a number of different possibilities of how to correct a
bias,269 and I sketched some suggestions in the discussion above. Below, I collate these into four categories: (1) self-correction by an individual; (2) education about particular biases or the circumstances
leading to susceptibility to them; (3) procedural interventions such as
cooling-off periods; and (4) substantive interventions, in which a decision is taken away from an individual either by substituting a third
party’s decision for his own, or by taking the decision away from him
in the first place. Ex post judicial paternalism, where a court acts
266. In re Baby M., 537 A.2d at 1248 (“Under the contract, the natural mother is irrevocably committed before she knows the strength of her bond with her child. She never
makes a totally voluntary, informed decision, for quite clearly any decision prior to the
baby’s birth is, in the most important sense, uninformed . . . .”).
267. Professor Hillman has pointed this out in another context as well. See Hillman,
supra note 123.
268. BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 3, at 9-10 (“A very large question
involves the extent to which education can counteract cognitive and motivational distortions, so as to eliminate some of the effects described above. . . . Is it possible for those involved in law to ‘debias’ people . . . ? What institutions work best at reducing the effects of
biases?”); see, e.g., Camerer et al., supra note 9, at 1219; Rachlinski, Uncertain Psychological Case, supra note 9, at 1219.
269. Camerer et al., supra note 9, at 1244-47 (outlining different types of paternalistic
intervention); see also Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 9, at 1188-90.
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retrospectively to relieve an individual of unanticipated consequences of a particular decision or decisionmaking process, might
also be seen as a substantive intervention, even though this sort of
substantive decision substitution would be at the individual’s behest.270
Second, it is important to compare the effectiveness of correcting
cognitive biases with any data on the effectiveness of correcting emotional biases. Again, to date most legal and empirical analysis has
been in the context of cognitive biases, with little attention paid to
emotional ones. Further, little attention has been paid to the effectiveness of potential corrective techniques. Indeed, even scholars
conducting empirical research on decisionmaking recognize the importance of further research on correcting emotional biases.271 I address such effectiveness below, discussing different attempts to remedy both cognitive and affective biases, and address whether such biases might be differentially correctable.
B. Effectiveness of Debiasing
The first two potential means of debiasing are closely related, and
involve somewhat less intrusive levels of intervention: self-correction
and education.
1. Debiasing Through Self-Correction
First, we might have a deliberate effort by the actor to correct biases. At first glance, this may be thought to occur with decisionmaking involving higher stakes than ordinary social judgments, either
because the higher stakes prompt more careful decisionmaking or
because those stakes increase the likelihood of recourse to other,
more reliable sources.272 Unfortunately, however, neither appears to
be the case. Financial incentives, for instance, are only unreliably
successful in ameliorating biases,273 and it is unclear whether the
270. See infra note 356.
271. Richard P. Larrick, Debiasing, in BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF JUDGMENT AND
DECISION MAKING, supra note 4, at 316, 334 (“Identifying debiasing techniques for affectbased biases is a promising new area.”).
272. See, e.g., Glaeser, supra note 9, at 140 (“Outside of the lab, people have access to
advisers, books, the Internet, and more time. Their willingness to spend time and money to
use these resources will surely depend on the stakes involved in the decision.”).
273. See, e.g., Colin F. Camerer & Robin M. Hogarth, The Effects of Financial Incentives in Experiments: A Review and Capital-Labor-Production Framework, 19 J. RISK &
UNCERTAINTY 7 (1999) (finding mixed results of influence of incentives on judgment and
decisionmaking tasks in 74 empirical studies); Ralph Hertwig et al., Judgments of Risk
Frequencies: Tests of Possible Cognitive Mechanisms, 31 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL:
LEARNING, MEMORY, & COGNITION 621 (2005) (noting financial incentives’ failure to influence judgment accuracy); Larrick, supra note 271, at 321 (observing that there is “little
empirical evidence [that] incentives consistently improve mean decision performance” (citation omitted)). But see Bruno S. Frey & Reiner Eichenberger, Economic Incentives Trans-
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judgment involved in recognizing when to seek recourse is not also
influenced by bounded rationality and other cognitive and, perhaps,
emotional limitations.274
Further, in order for self-correction to have a chance to succeed,
the individual must be aware of the bias and must be motivated to
correct it.275 There is some evidence that when awareness and motivation are both present, cognitive biases can be attenuated.276 But
people typically assume that they are unbiased.277 Moreover, it is unclear whether this awareness-and-motivation mechanism is successful for emotional biases.278 For instance, self-control problems that
lead to procrastination may not be overcome even by motivated individuals who recognize their difficulty. People do realize that they impulsively procrastinate, and even self-impose costly deadlines to try
to overcome such tendencies. 279 Nevertheless, they are unlikely to set
those deadlines effectively and optimally; outsiders can set deadlines
that are more effective.280 Other research shows that individuals who
were intrinsically motivated to make accurate evaluations of a target
person tried to compensate for irrelevant affective influence on their
judgment, but in fact tended to overcompensate.281 Additional studies
form Psychological Anomalies, 23 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 215, 225 (1994) (suggesting that
individuals act more rationally with increasing incentives, though biases are not always
eliminated).
274. Cf. Sunstein & Ullmann-Margalit, supra note 59 (because of bounded rationality,
“people may choose second-order strategies that badly disserve their own goals, even when
the stakes are high” (citation omitted)).
275. Wegner & Bargh, supra note 117, at 472 (“[I]f the person is not aware that [something] is influencing his or her judgment, no control is possible.” (citation omitted)); id. at
484 (“motivational impetus” is necessary to control biased decisionmaking).
276. Id.; see also Duane T. Wegener et al., Not All Stereotyping is Created Equal: Differential Consequences of Thoughtful Versus Nonthoughtful Stereotyping, 90 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 42, 43 (2006) (“[U]se of stereotypes is decreased when motivation to think about individuating information is relatively high, as when people expect to
be held accountable for their ratings of targets.” (citation omitted)); Timothy D. Wilson et
al., Mental Contamination and the Debiasing Problem, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra
note 3, at 185, 186-87 (noting elements necessary for correcting bias or “mental contamination,” including awareness of the bias and motivation and capacity to correct it).
277. Wilson et al., supra note 276, at 190 (“[P]eople’s default response is to assume that
their judgments are uncontaminated.”).
278. See Cathy McFarland et al., Mood Acknowledgment and Correction for the MoodCongruency Bias in Social Judgment, 39 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 483, 484 (2003)
(noting that “there has been relatively little research examining the circumstances that
prompt such mood correction”).
279. Dan Ariely & Klaus Wertenbroch, Procrastination, Deadlines, and Performance:
Self-Control by Precommitment, 13 PSYCHOL. SCI. 219, 224 (2002) (demonstrating that
“people strategically try to curb [procrastination] by using costly self-imposed deadlines,
and that self-imposed deadlines are not always as effective as some external deadlines in
boosting task performance”).
280. Id.
281. See, e.g., Leonard Berkowitz et al., On the Correction of Feeling-Induced Judgmental Biases, in FEELING AND THINKING: THE ROLE OF AFFECT IN SOCIAL JUDGMENTS, supra note 5, at 131; Linda M. Isbell & Robert S. Wyer, Jr., Correcting for Mood-Induced Bias
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demonstrate this risk of overcorrection—a risk discussed more fully
below—showing that although some motivated attention to one’s
mood can decrease affective biases, it is also possible that individuals
“ ‘go overboard’ in their correction efforts,”282 and make emotionallybiased judgments in the other direction despite their awareness and
motivation, and despite their increased efforts to think about the
particular decision target.283 Finally, individual differences tend to
play a role in whether attention to mood can decrease its biasing effects on judgment, sometimes in detrimental ways. Specifically, for
individuals who naturally tend to monitor their mood states, motivated processing can cause those in a good mood to make more accurate judgments than unmotivated processing.284 However, recall that
those in a negative mood tend to make less superficial judgments.285
Motivated processing, therefore, might reduce the mood effects for
such self-monitors. But because it was, in part, those effects that lead
to increased accuracy, the reduction came at the cost of judgment accuracy for those in a negative mood.
When motivated processing involves the active suppression of attitudes, cognitions, or emotions, there are other serious costs as well.
Suppression of emotional responses, as well as similar efforts to selfregulate, leads to what psychologist Roy Baumeister has called “egodepletion”—a decrease in postsuppression capacity to engage in similar self-control: “Acts of self-control, responsible decision making, and
active choice seem to interfere with other such acts that follow soon
after.”286 This decreased ability to self-regulate also follows efforts to
suppress stereotype use.287 Essentially, what Baumeister and col-

in the Evaluation of Political Candidates: The Roles of Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation,
25 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 237 (1999).
282. McFarland et al., supra note 278, at 489 (citing David DeSteno et al., supra note
149, and Victor C. Ottati & Linda M. Isbell, Effects of Mood During Exposure to Target Information on Subsequently Reported Judgments: An On-Line Model of Misattribution and
Correction, 71 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 39 (1996)).
283. Wegener et al., supra note 276, at 50 (noting that effortful thought may not only
lead to decreased use of stereotypes but may also create stereotypes more stable and resistant to change).
284. Joseph P. Forgas et al., Mood Effects on Eyewitness Memory: Affective Influences
on Susceptibility to Misinformation, 41 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 574, 584 (2005)
(demonstrating that explicit instructions to suppress affect worked only for individuals described as high self monitors and socially desirable).
285. See sources cited supra note 5.
286. Roy F. Baumeister et al., Ego Depletion: Is the Active Self A Limited Resource?, 74
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1252, 1263-64 (1998); see also Mark Muraven et al., SelfControl as Limited Resource: Regulatory Depletion Patterns, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 774 (1998); Mark Muraven & Roy F. Baumeister, Self-Regulation and Depletion
of Limited Resources: Does Self-Control Resemble a Muscle?, 126 PSYCHOL. BULL. 247
(2000).
287. Jennifer A. Richeson & J. Nicole Shelton, When Prejudice Does Not Pay: Effects of
Interracial Contact on Executive Function, 14 PSYCHOL. SCI. 287, 290 (2003); Jennifer A.
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leagues document is the tendency for active self-regulation to have
unintended consequences after that regulation ends. Although selfregulation may be successful in reducing biased decisionmaking, additional costs accrue that influence subsequent behavior and decisions—as in the overcorrection example above, but in different decisionmaking contexts. Depending on how serious that postregulation
behavior or decisionmaking is, therefore, the costs of such self-control
may outweigh its benefits. Accordingly (and unfortunately), these researchers suggest, “these results point to a potentially serious constraint on the human capacity for control (including self-control) and
deliberate decision making,”288 a constraint with important implications for paternalistic policies.289
A final concern for such motivated self-correction as a paternalistic intervention is semantic: under our initial definition, it is simply
difficult to conceptualize this phenomenon as paternalism. That is,
intrinsically motivated self-correction does not really involve much
actual third-party intrusion. When such self-correction is motivated
by another individual or by other extrinsic motivation, it more closely
approaches “paternalism” as such. From this perspective, it elides
easily into the second category of intervention, educating or informing people of biases.290
2. Debiasing Through Education
Indeed, taking either an informed consumer or a classical rational
decisionmaker perspective, providing information and education is
often seen as an ameliorative measure for overcoming shortcomings
or biases in decisionmaking.291 Simply providing an individual with
accurate information—regardless of its emotional valence—is seen as
facilitating autonomous decisionmaking, as in the abortion context
discussed above.292 Similarly, providing disclosure about a product—
regardless of its emotional valence or of its likely effect on a recipient—is seen as a viable means of avoiding liability for the recipient’s
Richeson & Sophie Trawalter, Why Do Interracial Interactions Impair Executive Function?
A Resource Depletion Account, 88 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 934, 944 (2005).
288. Baumeister et al., supra note 286, at 1264.
289. Individual differences may play a role in these effects. One recent study found
that suppression does lead to ego depletion and does lead to increased subsequent stereotyping, but only for individuals less likely to use stereotypes in the first place. Ernestine
H. Gordijn et al., Consequences of Stereotype Suppression and Internal Suppression Motivation: A Self-Regulation Approach, 30 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 212 (2004).
Thus, the good news of such research is the possibility that such ego depletion may not occur as a result of suppression—less promising is that that news only applies to those for
whom correction would be less likely.
290. Cf. Frey et al., supra note 273, at 224 (suggesting that formal education assists
individuals in recognizing decisionmaking biases).
291. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
292. Blumenthal, Abortion, Persuasion, and Emotion, supra note 22.
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choice about that product, as in the securities or credit card context.293
Unfortunately, however, this approach is not much more effective
than the last.294 In the cognitive context, for instance, one of the more
difficult biases to correct is the hindsight bias. Simply informing an
individual about the bias is usually unsuccessful;295 more aggressive
tactics are often required in order to be successful.296 Other biases,
such as the self-serving bias, can sometimes be corrected through
identifying counterarguments and asking a decisionmaker to list
weaknesses in his own position: “In the literature on debiasing, one
type of intervention stands out as effective against a wide range of
biases. This involves having subjects question their own judgment by
explicitly considering counterarguments to their own thinking.”297
293. See Camerer et al., supra note 9, at 1236-37 (discussing similar legislation in the
context of pensions, responding to the Enron failure: “a bill designed to induce 401(k) portfolio diversification by employees by requiring plan sponsors to ‘advis[e] participants and
beneficiaries of the importance of diversifying the investment of the assets in their accounts and of the risk of holding in their portfolios securities of any one entity, including
employer securities’ ”); Chris Guthrie, Law, Information, and Choice: Capitalizing on Heuristic Habits of Thought, in HEURISTICS AND THE LAW 425 (G. Gigerenzer & C. Engel eds.,
2006) (discussing disclosure assumptions); Richard L. Wiener et al., Unwrapping Assumptions: Applying Social Analytic Jurisprudence to Consumer Bankruptcy Education Requirements and Policy, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 453, 475 (2005) (In the context of the recent
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005: “[l]awmakers presume that enhanced credit card disclosure would help debtors to avoid incurring credit
card balances beyond their ability to repay and enable them to better assess and compare
credit card offers. Disclosure is also thought to deter predatory lending practices by providing consumers with needed information”); see also supra notes 233-37 and accompanying
text (discussing the securities context).
294. See, e.g., Robert Prentice, Whither Securities Regulation? Some Behavioral Observations Regarding Proposals for its Future, 51 DUKE L.J. 1397, 1490-91 (2002) (noting and
collecting citations showing that many cognitive biases relevant to investing are not “easily
remedied by information or education”); Wiener, supra note 293; see also infra notes 295324 and accompanying text.
295. See, e.g., Baruch Fischhoff, Perceived Informativeness of Facts, 3 J. EXPERIMENTAL
PSYCHOL: HUM. PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE 349, 356-57 (1977).
296. Rachlinski, supra note 125, at 603. For examples of difficulty with correcting the
hindsight bias, see Lawrence J. Sanna & Norbert Schwarz, Debiasing the Hindsight Bias:
The Role of Accessibility Experiences and (Mis)Attributions, 39 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC.
PSYCHOL. 287 (2003); Donald Sharpe & John G. Adair, Reversibility of the Hindsight Bias:
Manipulation of Experimental Demands, 56 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION
PROCESSES 233 (1993) (Study 1). For some successful correction efforts, see id. (Study 2),
using “never-knew-that” instructions, and Merrie Jo Stallard & Debra L. Worthington, Reducing the Hindsight Bias Utilizing Attorney Closing Arguments, 22 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
671 (1998), reducing hindsight bias for jurors.
297. Linda Babcock et al., Creating Convergence: Debiasing Biased Litigants, 22 LAW &
SOC. INQUIRY 913, 916 (1997); see, e.g., Craig A. Anderson, Inoculation and Counterexplanation: Debiasing Techniques in the Perseverance of Social Theories, 1 SOC. COGNITION
126 (1982) (alternative explanations successful at debiasing); Adam D. Galinsky & Gordon
B. Moskowitz, Counterfactuals As Behavioral Primes: Priming the Simulation Heuristic
and Consideration of Alternatives, 36 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 384 (2000) (priming
participants to think counterfactually decreased biases); Laura J. Kray & Adam D. Galinsky, The Debiasing Effect of Counterfactual Mind-Sets: Increasing the Search for Discon-
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This is also an approach with using “deautomatization” to decrease
the use of prejudicial stereotypes.298 Greg Mitchell recently summarized some of the relevant literature demonstrating that although it
is difficult, cognitive biases can sometimes be corrected through education and instruction; his conclusion was that the potential for debiasing militates against Sunstein and Thaler’s claim that paternalism
is inevitable.299
Another recommendation in the cognitive context has been for individuals simply to avoid the stimuli that might influence their decisions and judgments.300 Similarly, in the emotion context, some researchers have alluded to the possibility of educating decisionmakers
about differences between calm- and emotion-state decisions, with
the goal of helping them “avoid situations in which the dangerous
temptation might occur.”301 Indeed, in his discussion of law and emotions, Eric Posner has suggested that people do this naturally.302
There are difficulties with all of these approaches and inferences,
however, that illustrate that they would likely be infeasible or unsuccessful in the emotional bias context. First, we can hardly avoid all
emotion-eliciting stimuli. Second, contrary to Professor Posner’s suggestions, “we do not always know in advance whether information
will bias our judgments; therefore, excessive exposure control will result in the failure to receive information that is diagnostic and useful.”303 Third, directly relevant to the cost-benefit analysis, people will
have to be “extremely vigilant, ready to shut their eyes and cover
their ears whenever they suspected that potentially unwanted information was in the vicinity: Is such vigilance worth the effort it entails?”304
Fourth, in terms of counterarguments, it is hard to try to imagine
identifying some “weakness” in emotion per se. And as seen in the
hot-cold empathy gap section, it is also difficult to imagine oneself in

firmatory Information in Group Decisions, 91 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION
PROCESSES 69 (2003) (showing that priming participants to think counterfactually decreased biases in subsequent tasks). But see Sanna & Schwarz, supra note 296 (thinking
about alternative outcomes exacerbated hindsight bias).
298. See, e.g., Irene V. Blair & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Automatic and Controlled Processes
in Stereotype Priming, 70 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1142 (1996); Deana A. Pollard,
Unconscious Bias and Self-Critical Analysis: The Case for a Qualified Evidentiary Equal
Employment Opportunity Privilege, 74 WASH. L. REV. 913, 953 (1999) (“[I]f a subject deliberately processes nonstereotypical information, she may be able to overcome automatic
processes that create stereotypic responses.”).
299. See Mitchell, supra note 9, at 1277 n.40 (collecting studies concerning debiasing of
cognitive biases).
300. Wilson et al., supra note 276, at 195 (suggesting this “exposure control” strategy).
301. Loewenstein & Schkade, supra note 150, at 100.
302. See Posner, supra note 4.
303. Wilson et al., supra note 276, at 195.
304. Id.
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another state. That is, if an individual is in a positive mood, it is hard
to imagine decisionmaking in a negative mood (and may be even
harder vice versa); if he is in a sexually aroused state, it would be difficult to imagine the alternative.305 It is equally difficult to apply another means of reducing cognitive biases to the emotional context:
one way of reducing the reliance on prejudicial stereotypes is selffocus, sometimes as easy as placing a mirror in the room with someone making an evaluation. This apparently helps to heighten awareness of discrepancy between consciously held beliefs, on the one
hand, and unconscious stereotypes or negative responses, on the
other.306 It is unclear, though, how this might be done with emotional
biases, and emotion research does not suggest in detail how and why
it might be successful. Thus, despite difficulties correcting cognitive
biases through information and education, correcting emotional biases that way may be even harder.
Fifth, education as a debiasing mechanism is difficult and resource-intensive, especially in the emotional context. Moreover, it is
often unsuccessful;307 for instance, efforts at paternalistic education
regarding financial decisions is not especially effective.308 More
305. Ariely and Loewenstein recently suggested that this may also raise concerns in
the context of criminal law and punishment:
[J]udges and jurors, who are generally unaroused when making decisions of
guilt and punishment, may be excessively condemnatory and punitive toward
sexual offenders because they make their decisions in a sexually unaroused
state and fail to appreciate how intense sexual arousal would alter even their
own decision making in potentially compromising circumstances. The result is
that decisions will be stigmatized as immoral misbehavior even by people who
would themselves make the same choice when in an aroused state. It should be
clear that such effects of arousal cannot justify any sexual exploitation, but
they can make such behaviors somewhat more understandable. From the perspective of the legal system it is possible that sexual arousal should be given
more credit as a partially mitigating factor than it would normally receive.
Ariely & Loewenstein, supra note 220, at 96.
306. See John F. Dovidio et al., On the Nature of Prejudice: Automatic and Controlled
Processes, 33 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 510, 535-36 (1997); Ann C. McGinley, !Viva
la Evolución!: Recognizing Unconscious Motive in Title VII, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
415, 425-32, 488 nn.376-82 (2000).
307. Hanson & Kysar report that:
As Tversky and Kahneman have argued, “[e]ffective learning takes place only
under certain conditions: [I]t requires accurate and immediate feedback about
the relation between situational conditions and the appropriate response.”
These requirements often are not met because: (i) outcomes are commonly delayed and not easily attributable to a particular action; (ii) variability in the
environment degrades the reliability of the feedback . . .; (iii) there is often no
information about what the outcome would have been if another decision had
been taken; and (iv) most important decisions are unique and therefore provide
little opportunity for learning.
Hanson & Kysar, The Problem of Market Manipulation, supra note 252, at 691-92 (footnotes omitted) (citing Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions, in RATIONAL CHOICE: THE CONTRAST BETWEEN ECONOMICS AND
PSYCHOLOGY 67, 90-91 (Robin M. Hogarth & Melvin W. Reder eds., 1987)).
308. See, e.g., Hu, supra note 121, at 73.
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broadly, people view information and messages in biased fashion,
and thus are unlikely to consider the possibility that their judgments
are biased.309 Similarly, people may simply not believe the informational message to which they are exposed; and/or they may focus on
factors not captured by the message.310 Professor Sunstein illustrates
the difficulties of correcting perceptions biased by emotion in the context of risk regulation and probability neglect:
If government is attempting to decrease public concern with a risk
that has a tiny probability of coming to fruition, it may be ineffective if it emphasizes the issue of probability; indeed, it may do better if it changes the subject or stresses instead the affirmative social values associated with running the risk. On the other hand,
public fear, however unwarranted, may be intractable, in the sense
that it may be impervious to efforts at reassurance. And if public
fear is intractable, it will cause serious problems, partly because
fear is itself extremely unpleasant and partly because fear is likely
to influence conduct, possibly producing wasteful and excessive
private precautions. If so, a governmental response, via regulatory
safeguards, would appear to be justified if the benefits, in terms of
fear reduction, justify the costs.311

Sunstein’s point is:
not simply that people may well misunderstand risk disclosures,
perceiving the hazard as far greater than it is in fact. The problem
is that the disclosure may alarm people, causing various kinds of
harms, without giving them any useful information at all. If people
neglect probability, they may fix, or fixate, on the bad outcome in a
way that will cause anxiety and distress, but without altering behavior or even improving understanding.312

His concluding “lesson for policy: It might not be helpful to present people with a wide range of information, containing both more
assuring and less assuring accounts.”313
Another example of unsuccessful debiasing is in the context of the
endowment effect. Some researchers have applied the lessons of cog309. Charles G. Lord et al., Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The Effects
of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 2098 (1979) (showing that subjects who opposed capital punishment critiqued
studies purporting to show that it is a deterrent more than studies showing it is not; studies favoring capital punishment did the opposite); Steven B. Most et al., How Not to Be
Seen: The Contribution of Similarity and Selective Ignoring to Sustained Inattentional
Blindness, 12 PSYCHOL. SCI. 9 (2001).
310. Paul Slovic, Perception of Risk, in THE PERCEPTION OF RISK 220 (2000).
311. Sunstein, supra note 7, at 69-70.
312. Id. at 91.
313. Id. at 82. There is also empirical evidence that emotionally-based attitudes are
less influenced by cognitively-based persuasion than by that which is emotionally-based.
See Kari Edwards, The Interplay of Affect and Cognition in Attitude Formation and
Change, 59 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 202 (1990).
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nitive debiasing, looking at whether the EE could be ameliorated by
perspective-taking.314 Both cognitive and emotional biases prevent
that, however. Cognitively, people overestimate the similarity between their own valuation of a good and the valuation by another.315
Emotionally, this false prediction stems in part from people’s biased
emotional predictions of how much they would value the good if they
were in the shoes of the other party, whether that party is owner or
buyer.316 That is, not only do people not predict that they will develop
an increased liking from a commodity once it is owned, but people
also take that increased valuation as an objective value and assume
that a buyer would in fact value it approximately the same way (conversely, a potential buyer assumes that the seller values it approximately the same as she does). This leads to inefficiencies in the form
of missed transactions.
Sixth, the awareness/motivation issues arise again. It is typically
necessary that people be aware of their incidental or target-related
mood in order to correct for it.317 As noted above, drawing attention to
potential emotional bias can sometimes ameliorate the bias. However, this is clearly enormously difficult for a third party to monitor
and continue to educate about—even with encouragement, people
likely do not conduct their everyday activities monitoring their affective states. Even if that were feasible, it is simply unclear whether
such attention works similarly for positive and negative moods,318
and such awareness is not consistently effective for all people in all
situations.319
Seventh, individuals tend to persevere with wrong thinking even
when educated, and even recognizing that it is wrong. This is especially likely in the emotional bias context: again, recall Denes-Raj
and Epstein’s jellybean experiment, where subjects’ emotional or experiential reasoning overcame their rational reasoning, even when
they were explicitly instructed about, and clearly understood, the
relevant probabilities.320 The perseverance of emotionally-comforting
superstitious activities or rituals, even though one “knows” rationally
that they do not affect an outcome, illustrates this as well.
Finally, as mentioned above, even when biases are recognized,
and people are motivated to correct them, individuals actually tend

314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.

Van Boven et al., supra note 169.
Id. at 67.
Id.
McFarland et al., supra note 278, at 484.
See supra note 147.
See Joseph P. Forgas, supra note 195, at 596, 601 (noting exceptions).
See supra note 114.
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to overcorrect for those biases.321 That is, when someone realizes that
an incidental emotion might bias her decision, she may try to correct
for it. However, because she may not always accurately assess the intensity and duration of her emotions,322 and because she may not accurately assess the degree of her emotional biases,323 she may overcorrect for the bias, leading to biased judgments in the opposite direction.324
3. Debiasing Through Procedural Interventions
A number of procedural steps might be taken to improve individuals’ decisionmaking or to protect them from the consequences of
their biased or faulty decisions. Sunstein and Thaler’s default rules
are a good example; as are the “cooling-off periods” that are often
suggested and occasionally implemented, with the goal of giving consumers or others a chance to reconsider what might have been a
hasty or emotionally-influenced decision.
The effect of choosing and changing default rules is thoroughly
discussed in Sunstein and Thaler’s work.325 Their focus, however, was
on such rules’ effects on cognitive biases; it is not yet clear whether
the changes they proposed would be as effective for addressing the
influence of emotion. Cooling-off periods, in contrast, are designed
explicitly to counter the effect of emotional bias, by allowing the emotional state to dissipate and the decisionmaker (individual or institutional) to return to a cooler, calmer, more “rational” state.
As Camerer and others have noted, there are at least two different
kinds of cooling-off periods.326 The first prevents a decisionmaker
from making a decision or enacting a behavior until some amount of
time has passed, presumably enough for the emotional state to dissipate.327 The second allows the decision to be made or the behavior to
be enacted during the “hot” emotional state, but permits the actor to
321. See, e.g., Ehud Guttel, Overcorrection, 93 GEO. L.J. 241 (2004) (noting that the legal system sometimes corrects for overcorrection); C. Neil Macrae et al., Out of Mind but
Back in Sight: Stereotypes on the Rebound, 67 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 808 (1994).
322. Blumenthal, Affective Forecasting, supra note 4, at 166.
323. See, e.g., Van Boven et al., supra note 169.
324. Berkowitz et al., supra note 281; Isbell & Wyer, supra note 281 (documenting
overcorrection for mood-induced biases). This is also relevant to one of Mitchell’s suggestions in the context of debiasing. Reviewing the relative success of consider-the-alternative
and opposing-argument techniques for correcting cognitive biases, he suggests that they
“appear to have the salutary characteristic that, even if ineffective, make them unlikely to
worsen the situation, though this is an empirical question that remains to be answered
more definitively.” Mitchell, supra note 137, at 135. It seems, though, that even such
mechanisms have the potential to backfire. Cf. Wegner & Bargh, supra note 117, at 473-74
(noting potential for efforts to correct cognitive biases to backfire).
325. Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 9, at 1187.
326. Camerer et al., supra note 9, at 1240.
327. Id.
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change her mind and revoke the decision, or possibly the consequences of the behavior.328
Although both sorts are discussed as corrective paternalistic
steps, and although both have in fact been applied in certain circumstances, both have flaws that suggest caution in their implementation, though not necessarily the caution that Camerer and colleagues
have suggested. For instance, Camerer and colleagues suggest that
cooling-off periods are somewhat “intrusive,” and as such should “be
implemented with . . . reticence and only after careful analysis.”329
They may be referring to the first sort of policy, involving mandatory
waiting periods before a consumer may take possession of a purchase. The latter sort, however, allowing a buyer to change his mind
within a certain time frame, does not seem terribly intrusive, especially to the extent that it simply mandates inaction, providing an
opportunity to sit back and allow an emotional influence to dissipate.330
But difficulties exist nevertheless. The first type of cooling-off,
simply waiting for an emotional state to die down, may not always be
feasible. First, of course, either the actor or the intervenor must recognize the possibility of affective bias. As suggested above, actors are
often simply unaware of the potential for such bias.331 It is also difficult for third parties to anticipate the influence of emotion unrelated
to a judgment task and to prescribe a corrective.332 Second, relatedly,
individuals must often make judgments or decisions about emotionally-laden events or risks.333 It is unclear that the emotion associated
with such decisions might dissipate; to some extent, considering the
decision will continually evoke some strong, potentially biasing emotion. The risk of terrorism, disease, or nuclear accidents are facile
examples, but consider also the emotions the surrogate mother experiences upon giving birth. Presumably, the emotions associated
with raising the child continue—even after the emotions associated
328. Id. A third sort is similar but places more of a burden on the decisionmaker by allowing a decision but requiring a subsequent confirmatory action in order to finalize the
purchase, decision, or other choice. See, e.g., Péter Cserne, How (Not) to Use Behavioral
Economics in Justifying Paternalism: Methodological Issues and Some Applications in
Contract Law (paper presented at the Behavioral and Experimental Law and Economics
Conference, Haifa, Israel (June 2006)) (on file with author).
329. Camerer et al., supra note 9, at 1239.
330. Shapiro, supra note 16, at 531 n.42 (suggesting that “imposition of a brief waiting
period[ ] may be considered nonpaternalist, or at most to be paternalism of an especially
weak, nonintrusive character”). The confirmatory action sort that Cserne mentions, supra
note 328, might be seen as more intrusive.
331. See Camerer et al., supra note 9, at 1252 (noting that “people are unlikely to be
aware of their errors”).
332. It seems odd at best, for instance, to dictate that decisions requiring thorough
analysis or processing may not be made on a sunny day, which elevates someone’s mood
and potentially leads to superficial analysis.
333. See supra Part III.C.2.a.
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with physically carrying the child end—and thus affect the decision
to relinquish the child or not. Similarly, property owners subject to
the endowment effect will likely not lose their glow of ownership; indeed, the effect demonstrates that that glow may only grow warmer.
As Camerer and colleagues recognize, the second type of coolingoff period, allowing or encouraging the reversibility of decisions, can
also be moot: “it is impossible, for example, to undo unsafe sex or suicide.”334 But even where relevant, such cooling-off—like efforts to correct other biases—may simply be ineffective or even counterproductive. For instance, substantial research demonstrates that once a decision is made, individuals tend to feel committed to it and seek to
rationalize the decision by focusing on the benefits or positive aspects
of the outcome of the decision or the product chosen.335 Individuals
may thus tend not to change their mind even when they have the option to.
Such a tendency might in fact reinforce the perceived benefits of
cooling-off periods and of the opportunity for reversible decisions.
And, at least in the abstract, people think they prefer such changeable outcomes. People behave as though reversible decisions are
beneficial, and try to “pay premiums today for the opportunity to
change their minds tomorrow.”336 However, cooling-off interventions
that impose such opportunities may in fact be more problematic than
assumed. As implied earlier in the discussion of “keeping doors
open,”337 people are actually less satisfied with their choices when decisions are reversible, deriving less utility from their choice or from
the outcome than if the decision had been unchangeable. Accordingly, if a cooling-off period is imposed paternalistically on consumers
in order to allow an emotional state to disappear, but consumers
know that the cooling-off period applies, then they may actually derive less utility from the good than if it had been an irreversible sale:
“buyers who pay to have escape clauses in their contracts may paradoxically undermine, rather than advance, the cause of their own
satisfaction.”338
4. Debiasing Through Substantive Interventions
The three relatively unintrusive mechanisms above might appeal
to those who are concerned about nonoptimal decisionmaking, but
who are nevertheless sensitive to autonomy or liberty concerns.
Those less sensitive, or those persuaded by the empirical research
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.

Camerer et al., supra note 9, at 1240.
Gilbert & Ebert, supra note 61.
Id. at 504.
Shin & Ariely, supra note 60, at 575.
Gilbert & Ebert, supra note 61, at 505.
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reviewed earlier that such concerns must be held to a higher burden
of persuasion, or those persuaded by the empirical research that such
mechanisms are largely unsuccessful, might turn to more intrusive,
substantive paternalistic intervention. From this perspective, at
least two forms of governmental intervention might be appropriate:
legislative (in which I include agency decisionmaking) and judicial.
Both involve affirmatively substituting a third party’s decision or
judgment for an individual’s, or involve constraining the individual’s
decisionmaking options to eliminate the possibility of nonoptimal
choices.
(a) Legislative Substitution
The classic objection to such legislative (and even judicial) judgment substitution appeared earlier: people know their tastes and
preferences and act rationally to achieve them, better than any third
party might know or do. As sketched above, though, people do make
poor decisions.339 That observation, however—which drives much of
this literature in the first place—does not necessarily demonstrate
that a third party such as the government could do better. The essential question is whether a third party’s perception of “what is good for
me” is sufficiently better than my perception (flawed as it may be)
that it should act to replace or constrain my choices. The prevailing
assumption, most famously expressed by John Stuart Mill, is that it
is not:
[W]ith respect to his own feelings and circumstances, the most ordinary man or woman has means of knowledge immeasurably surpassing those that can be possessed by anyone else. The interference of society to overrule his judgement and purposes in what
only regards himself, must be grounded on general presumptions;
which may be altogether wrong, and even if right, are as likely as
not to be misapplied to individual cases, by persons no better acquainted with the circumstances of such cases than those are who
look at them merely from without.340

339. See supra notes 37-47 and accompanying text.
340. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY, reprinted in J.S. MILL: ON LIBERTY IN FOCUS 21,
91 (John Gray & G.W. Smith eds., 1991). The sentiment is oft-repeated. LOUIS KAPLOW &
STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 412 n.32 (2002); Glaeser, supra note 9, at
143 (raising the question of “whether private or public decisionmakers are more likely to
get things right when there are endogenous errors”); Kahneman, supra note 21, at 107
(“[T]he observed deficiencies [in consumer rationality] suggest the outline of a case in favor
of some paternalistic interventions, when it is plausible that the state knows more about
an individual’s future tastes than the individual knows presently.”); id. at 116 (asking
whether paternalistic actions are warranted where “an outsider can . . . predict an individual’s future utility far better than the individual can”); Shapiro, supra note 16, at 546
(“[A]n individual is likely to have a better idea than anyone else of how a particular choice
fits his circumstances and goals. It has never been shown that, as a general matter, A can
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But in some instances, a third party may in fact make better
choices and judgments regarding a particular individual’s preferences than that individual might himself. Importantly, at least three
of these contexts are ones in which emotional biases are present.
First, supporting the Millian perspective, it seems correct as an empirical matter that third parties ordinarily overestimate the risk
preferences of others.341 However, recall that in the context of negative events, overoptimism tends to reduce individuals’ perceptions of
self-relevant risks;342 in one sense, overestimation might in fact bring
the third party’s estimates closer to the truth. But recall that Hsee
and Weber also showed that when the target of the prediction—that
is, the person whose risk preferences are being estimated—is made
salient, or “vivid,” the overestimation disappears.343 Personal interaction or actual familiarity with the person is not necessary; in Hsee
and Weber’s research, all that was necessary was visual observation.344 Thus, it may be that simply identifying the target individual
to the third party may ameliorate overestimation by that third party,
and may result in more accurate risk estimation than might simply
leaving the decision to the potentially emotional individual.
Two clearer examples exist. Recall Professor Hsee’s other research, demonstrating that when decisions are made about emotionally-laden tasks, individuals tend to ignore probabilities except at extremes.345 Failure to attend to the probability of an event actually occurring may easily lead to poor judgments on the individual’s part;
when these individuals join together and express these inaccurate
judgments, decisionmaking about such events can be biased. When
decisionmakers attend more to “calculation,” however—to objective
factors—and less to emotional aspects of an event, their judgments
and decisions are far more sensitive to the accurately identified relative probabilities.346 Where lay perceptions of risk are biased due to
emotional factors, more accurate third-party judgments of those risks

do a better job of choosing for B than B can do for himself . . . .”); O’Donoghue & Rabin, supra note 225, at 186 (“Most adults in most situations make better choices for themselves
than others would make for them. . . .”); Zamir, supra note 18, at 236 (noting that the fact
that policymakers “lack intimate familiarity with the people to whom their rules apply . . .
increases the probability that state paternalism will be ill-informed and counterproductive”). But see id. at 239 (suggesting, based on empirical observation of judgment and decision errors, that “Mill’s objection is unsound”).
341. Hsee & Weber, supra note 216, at 52.
342. See supra note 42.
343. Hsee & Weber, supra note 216, at 52.
344. Id.
345. See supra notes 179-86 and accompanying text.
346. Id.
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should be substituted.347 Relevant contexts might be perceptions of
nuclear accidents, terrorism,348 or self-relevant risks such as smoking
or other addictive behavior.
What of the possibility that the very decisionmakers being substituted may also be subject to the impact of the emotionally-laden
judgment?349 Again, being one step removed from the decision target
may ameliorate that effect, as may the increased likelihood of focusing on calculation. But some evidence also suggests that the act of
group deliberation—though it does not necessarily ameliorate cognitive biases, and is subject to other risks such as group polarization
and groupthink350—may in fact alleviate some emotional biases on
judgment.351 If so, then shifting decisions to deliberative groups,
rather than to individuals and rather than to nondeliberative groups
such as voters, might be useful in order to avoid emotional biases.352
Recall that many of the emotional biases reviewed above stemmed
from the influence of concurrently experienced moods. A potential
third-party intervenor, of course, is less likely to be under the influ347. Cf. Matthew D. Adler, Fear Assessment: Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Pricing of
Fear and Anxiety, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 977, 985 (2004) (suggesting, in a different context,
that “[p]opularly perceived risk should not determine risk regulation”).
348. But see Guthrie, supra note 158 (suggesting that predictive errors put policy makers in an awkward position).
349. A common argument against shifting decisionmaking authority to legislators or
agency members is that they are subject to the same biases that shift is seeking to prevent.
E.g., Clayton P. Gillette & James E. Krier, Risks, Courts, and Agencies, 138 U. PA. L. REV.
1027, 1093-94 (1990) (“Experts, being human, are susceptible to the cognitive limitations
that burden all of us, and this is one reason why instances of expert failure are so familiar
to everyone. . . . [Thus,] expert competence nevertheless falls considerably short of the demands of the very comprehensive rationality that experts would strive to serve, and this
matters in the choice of institutional arrangements.”).
350. See generally Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Who Decides? Privileging Public Sentiment
About Justice and the Substantive Law, 72 UMKC L. REV. 1, 20 (2003) (noting potential for
these effects in deliberating groups); cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why
Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71, 106-08 (2000) (discussing group polarization effects).
351. See Blumenthal, Mood and Moral Judgment, supra note 4, at 21-22 (reviewing
such evidence).
352. Indeed, this is one characterization of multi-cameral government generally, and of
provisions of the U.S. Constitution in particular—as an effort to “protect the people against
itself.” Samuel Issacharoff, The Enabling Role of Democratic Constitutionalism: Fixed
Rules and Some Implications for Contested Presidential Elections, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1985,
1988 (2003) (quoting Jon Elster, Intertemporal Choice and Political Thought, in CHOICE
OVER TIME 35, 40 (George Loewenstein & Jon Elster eds., 1992)). That is, such governance
is seen as “a structural limitation on . . . the risk of ‘passion’ in democratic governance.” Id.
at 1989. Both cooling-off and deliberative aspects of such governance suggest this characterization. See also Glaeser, supra note 9, at 156 (“Institutions like the Supreme Court and
the Senate, which effectively create cooling-off periods that allow for debate that is not tied
to a general election, may reduce errors of policy.”). Professor Sunstein has suggested that
to the extent legislators are expressing the will of the electorate, such legislative action
need not even be considered paternalism. Sunstein, supra note 49, at 1141 (arguing that
the actions of a voting majority seeking to bind itself through legislative action need not be
considered “paternalism”).
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ence of the biasing mood in question. However, given that it is virtually impossible to predict what sort of incidental mood an individual
might be subject to at the time of a particular decision task, substantive legislative paternalism in this sense may be tantamount to removing all decisions from individual decisionmakers; again, such a
step seems disproportionate. Broadly speaking though, the justification for this sort of substantive legislative paternalism may be not
that such decisionmakers necessarily know individuals better than
they do themselves, or necessarily make better decisions and judgments.353 Rather, the justification may simply be that they are more
likely to be free of particular emotional biases. Thus, one implication
is to suggest cooling-off periods for judgments or decisions that are
likely to be biased by immediate or incidental affect, and the use of
experts or other substitute decisionmakers for judgments about or
involving emotionally-laden events.354
(b) Judicial Substitution
As Klick and Mitchell have suggested, it is useful to distinguish
between ex ante paternalism, of the sort outlined in the sections
above, and ex post paternalism, in which a third party, typically governmental, acts retrospectively to “insulate the decision maker from
the consequences of [a] thoughtless choice.”355 Here, again, we might
think of a court stepping in to relieve an individual from the consequences of an emotionally-biased decision as such ex post or judicial
paternalism.356
353. Though they may in fact, due to expertise in a particular area. E.g., Chris Guthrie
& Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Insurers, Illusions of Judgment & Litigation, 59 VAND. L. REV.
2017 (2006).
354. Another common objection to the use of such “experts,” legislative or agency, is the
possibility that the decisionmakers will be subject to “capture.” Though I fully recognize
the objection, it warrants more extensive treatment than is available here. And, while fully
recognizing the argument’s influence, I would also note comments bringing it into question. E.g., Paul Burstein, The Impact of Public Opinion on Public Policy: A Review and an
Agenda, 56 POL. RES. Q. 29 (2003) (providing data showing that impact of interest groups
and other elites on policy is less than is traditionally assumed); Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section 1: From Nondelegation to Exclusive Delegation, 104 COLUM. L.
REV. 2097, 2144 (2004) (noting theoretical and practical arguments against agencies’ “policy drift” in general and capture in particular). Thus, the objection is relevant but I will
bracket it for now.
355. Klick & Mitchell, supra note 9, at 1636.
356. One commentator has suggested that because the individual initiates the court
action, any judicial relief could not be paternalistic, as it would be consistent with the individual’s preferences. Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Paternalism, Unconscionability Doctrine,
and Accommodation, 29 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 205, 210 (2000) (“How then could rescission
be paternalist since that is what the putatively protected party wills?”). As described
above, however, see supra notes 19-24 and accompanying text, there is a tension between
an expressed preference at one time that (a) is different from that expressed at another
time and, more important, (b) does not reflect what the decisionmaker’s true preferences
would be at the time of the expressed preference. Because the later preference is inconsis-
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Such judicial paternalism might manifest in at least three ways,
two retrospective in the sense just defined, and one—more narrow—
prospective. First, as outlined in some of the examples presented earlier, a court might not choose to, or be able to, explicitly reverse a decision that was made due to emotional bias. Instead, the court might
impose liability on the party that prompted the affective influence on
the decision. Traditional principles could be broadened in order to determine such liability. In Professor Huang’s application, for instance,
securities fraud doctrine would be expanded to include the influence
of affective factors on investor decisionmaking. Professor Marrow advocates expanding unconscionability doctrine and developing a new
unconscionability tort. Professors Hanson and Kysar provide new
justification for applying enterprise liability in the context of deliberate manipulation by industry and/or advertisers. And, though not
advocating per se liability, I have suggested broadening the analysis
under Casey of whether state-mandated “informed consent” information might constitute an “undue burden” in a woman’s decisionmaking about abortion by inappropriately creating an emotional state
that increases her susceptibility to persuasion.357
Second, courts might void a contract because of emotional influence. This could, of course, take place under a showing of traditional
emotional duress. But more broadly, it also might stem from a showing that something induced a biasing emotional state, either conduct
by one party (as in manipulation), or language in a contract (analogous to the securities litigation example). It may also arise from a
broader reading of traditional contract doctrine, in two possible ways
(both developed in the surrogate mother context). On one account,
recognizing that emotions might be mispredicted, and thus change,
may justify such a change as the sort of “changed circumstances”
that should void a contract. On another account, such failure to fully
predict or understand one’s future emotions vitiates the fully informed consent necessary to the formation of a valid contract.358
Third, more speculatively, a court might prospectively strike down
conduct by a defendant that will probably lead to emotional manipulation. This possibility may be most relevant in the abortion decisionmaking context sketched above: if a state mandates particular
information in an “informed consent” provision, and if it can be
shown that such information is likely to influence a large proportion
tent with the biased previous one and, by assumption, is more consistent with what the individual’s unbiased preferences would be, intervention can be considered paternalistic. But
see Shapiro, supra note 16, at 549 (noting suggestion that person at Time1 is sufficiently
different from person at Time2 that Time2 intervention need not even be considered paternalistic).
357. See Blumenthal, Abortion, Persuasion, and Emotion, supra note 22.
358. See Blumenthal, Affective Forecasting, supra note 4, at 210.
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of the women in question, then there may be an argument under Casey for striking down the provision as unconstitutional.359 Again, I
treat this discussion at more length elsewhere,360 but it is a useful instance of a court intervening prospectively to protect an individual
from emotionally-biased decisionmaking.
In many of these contexts, the biases result from another party’s
manipulation. For all, however, the important judicial analysis will
be ascertaining causality, both in the link between the defendant’s
conduct and the experience of the particular biasing emotion or
mood, and between the emotion or mood and the decision—for the
latter, perhaps some sort of “but for” causation.
At least two objections to judicial paternalism arise: institutional
objections and a “slippery slope” argument. Professor Shapiro has
suggested that legislatures are in a better institutional position than
courts to act paternalistically.361 Professors Kaplow and Shavell
make a similar suggestion, based on their skepticism that courts can
know litigants sufficiently well to ascertain their true preferences
correctly.362 I am not wholly persuaded by either point. First, Professor Shapiro in part suggests that courts should be restrained given
our society’s commitment “to the value of self-determination.”363 Of
course, this objection—addressed in the section above discussing justifications for paternalism—might apply equally well, or equally
poorly, to legislative paternalistic action. Shapiro also points to institutional constraints on courts, such as their reactive rather than
proactive nature, the binding nature of precedent, and courts’ inability relative to legislatures to undertake information gathering, investigation, and experimentation and monitoring of experiment outcomes.364 Accurate as these comments might be as descriptions of the
courts’ role, none shows dispositively that a court is an inappropriate
vehicle for administering relief to an individual whose decision, by
hypothesis, does not reflect his true preferences. Indeed, courts are
routinely faced with individual litigants, a need to gather information concerning those litigants, and decisionmaking based heavily on
those facts and information. This fact also goes to the second part of
the institutional objection—that courts are insufficiently familiar
with the subjects of the paternalistic action, and therefore are less
able than the party or a legislature to ascertain that party’s true

359. Cf. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 894 (1992)
(“The proper focus of constitutional inquiry is the group for whom the law is a restriction,
not the group for whom the law is irrelevant.”).
360. See Blumenthal, Abortion, Persuasion, and Emotion, supra note 22.
361. See Shapiro, supra note 16.
362. KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 340, at 413 n.32.
363. Shapiro, supra note 16, at 521.
364. Id. at 551-55.
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preferences. Robin West has suggested that judges faced with such
individual litigants are in fact in a better position than legislators to
make such determinations;365 Kaplow and Shavell are “skeptical,”
particularly for appellate courts that “may never even meet the parties.”366 But the point here is that the plaintiff has asked the court to
overturn an earlier decision as inconsistent with her true preferences. Accordingly, the judicial analysis, again, is focused less on ascertaining those preferences—though proving them may still be a
hurdle—and more on traditional questions such as causation. The institutional objection, therefore, is not fatal to this approach.
Second, the slippery slope objection might argue that simply as a
quantitative matter, litigation designed to rescind contracts or excuse a party from a decision or from obligations will increase. A facile
response is that that possibility is an empirical matter: we will have
to simply wait and see. Another response, however, is that by hypothesis, we do have a plaintiff experiencing an injury—in the form
of nonoptimal consequences that the individual erroneously chose—
from which he should be protected. And “[i]t is the business of the
law to remedy wrongs that deserve it, even at the expense of a ‘flood
of litigation.’ ”367 Finally, and perhaps ironically, it might be that
drawing attention to the possibility of emotional bias by establishing
a judicial remedy might alleviate the mistakes in the first place. That
is, awareness of the remedy might heighten focus on emotional influences when an individual engages in decisionmaking, thereby reducing the likelihood that that emotion will influence that decisionmaking and avoiding the possibilities of moral hazard. If so, establishing
such a regime might in fact decrease the likelihood of such mistakes
and of the litigation that might ensue.
One might also object as a qualitative matter: because the plaintiff enters the litigation with the bare assertion that her preferences
have changed, such litigation could have an inappropriately increased chance of success. Again, however, the plaintiff has the burden of proof: not only for causation—showing that defendant’s conduct induced a particular emotional state—but also for what her true
preferences might have been. Concomitantly, she must demonstrate
that absent the emotional manipulation she would more likely have
made the alternative decision.368 Professor Marrow’s requirement

365. Robin L. West, Taking Preferences Seriously, 64 TUL. L. REV. 659 (1990).
366. KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 340, at 413 n.32.
367. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 56 (5th ed.
1984).
368. In the abortion context, the fact that she sought an abortion might be one step toward showing this, though hardly dispositive. See also John Kindley, Comment, The Fit
Between the Elements for an Informed Consent Cause of Action and the Scientific Evidence
Linking Induced Abortion with Increased Breast Cancer Risk, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 1595, 1640
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that plaintiff show “damages directly and exclusively attributable to
[defendant’s] act or actions” in part illustrates this burden.369 Of
course, plaintiff would also have to show some injury that resulted
from the biased decision.
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
There is little question that individuals do not conform well to the
rational decisionmaker model posited by traditional law and economics. Our reasoning and decisionmaking about what is good for us is
often flawed, our ability and motivation to seek full and unbiased information is often low, our susceptibility to manipulation by others is
often high. These cognitive failings often serve us poorly, and legal
and policy commentary has begun to turn toward consideration of
what such failings imply about the propriety of third-party intervention to protect us from ourselves.
Less consideration has been given, however, to the implications of
judgmental errors stemming from emotional factors. In this Article I
highlighted differences between cognitive and emotional sources of
such errors, reviewing a number of affective biases that had not been
raised previously in the legal literature, and discussed “emotional
paternalism”—that is, what implications such affective biases might
have for paternalistic policy. More important, I discussed in more detail than previous work has the effectiveness with which some of
these affective errors might be corrected. Commentators have recently decided that “paternalism is here to stay,”370 and that as a result, we must balance the costs and benefits of developing such intervention in determining whether it is appropriate. The discussion
in Part IV of broad paternalistic interventions to debias individuals
in their decisionmaking contributes to the discussion of such balancing. I showed that many such interventions are less likely to succeed
than may have been assumed, especially in the context of emotional
biases. I suggested that because of such difficulties, substituting the
judgment of experts from the legislative or judicial context may in
certain circumstances be appropriate.
In particular, legislatures might develop cooling-off periods for
judgments or decisions that are likely to be biased by immediate or
incidental emotions, especially ones involving self-relevant health
and welfare risks.371 Expert judgment in place of individuals’ might
(“Although . . . the plaintiff’s testimony about what she would have decided is not determinative, it is still relevant.”).
369. See Marrow, supra note 43, at 38 (identifying the tort of Consequential Procedural
Unconscionability and defining its elements).
370. Glaeser, supra note 9, at 156.
371. Cf. id. (advocating the restriction of “paternalistic activities to areas where there
is strong evidence of self-harm, like particularly dangerous drugs or suicide”).
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be appropriate for judgments about or involving emotionally-laden
events, such as disease, terrorism, and other high-risk but lowprobability events. Judicial intervention may be appropriate when an
individual should be relieved of the burdens of having made an emotionally-biased, harmful decision, especially one that can be shown to
have been manipulated by another. Examples were fear- or anxietyinfluenced abortion decisions, deliberate manipulation by advertisers
or contractual parties, or certain investment decisions. Thus, procedural and even substantive paternalism is likely appropriate in
many cases involving emotional biases, because the potential welfare
benefits are high and the implementation costs, at least in terms of
likelihood of success, are relatively low.
But as my debiasing review suggests, there are a number of instances in which implementation costs are high, because the effectiveness of debiasing or corrective measures is relatively low. In emotional paternalism instances in which implementation costs are elevated because intervention is not especially likely to succeed—my
examples were various sorts of informational and educational intervention—interference in decisionmaking may be unwarranted, not
because the decisions or consequences are unimportant and the benefits not high, but because the costs are, at least apparently, equally
high. If intervention is likely to be unsuccessful, perhaps the “plausible prima facie reason to be cautious about paternalism”—the autonomy argument—can shoulder its persuasive burden.372
Moreover, there are many instances in which affective biases impinge on judgment and decisionmaking, but the implications of the
individual judgment may not rise to the level of, say, judgments
about terrorist attack, nuclear meltdown, disposition of frozen embryos, or surrogate motherhood. Here, there are costs other than implementation costs to consider: various derivative costs of paternalistic activity. Professor Glaeser has suggested some such costs, such as
stigmatization of those who engage in particular conduct.373 But it is
also the case that “social forces strongly influence the personal
choices that affect . . . the beliefs, values and preferences—of individuals, care providers and policy makers—that determine when,
and what kinds of, public interventions will be successful, or even acceptable.”374 One such social force is the passionate adherence to the
importance of autonomy, especially in domains most likely to be in-

372. Blumenthal, Affective Forecasting, supra note 4, at 237.
373. Glaeser, supra note 9, at 150 (discussing emotional or psychic tax that results
from soft paternalism, such as stigmatization of regulated behavior).
374. Shireen J. Jejeebhoy, The Importance of Social Science Research in Protecting
Adolescents’ Sexual and Reproductive Choice, 18 MED. & L. 255 (1999).
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volved in emotional paternalism.375 Simply referring to “paternalism”
can itself generate negative emotional responses, leading, as noted
above, to a visceral unwillingness to accept the proposed intervention
“as a matter of principle.”376 Certainly, the psychic cost of public reluctance to comply with a policy perceived as imposing on autonomy
is one to be carefully incorporated into the cost-benefit analysis.377
That is, one factor in that analysis is the public’s potentially different
perceptions of interventions dealing with emotion and ones dealing
with thoughts or cognitions; the public may be even more unwilling
to accept intervention dealing with emotional issues. Such psychic
costs are clearly relevant in developing policy for protecting individuals in their decisions in relatively less important domains. The
calculus should be considered too, though, even in more important
domains.378
As such, paternalism is often appropriate and sometimes warranted, but should be applied only after careful cost-benefit analysis,
including the costs of implementing the particular policy in question.
In this I agree with recent commentators.379 Absent from their discussion, however, has been consideration of emotional biases in
judgment, of what empirical research suggests about remedying such
biases, and of the implications of such research for assessing such
“implementation costs.” By highlighting “emotional paternalism,” my
goal has been to help fill these gaps and further extend this important discussion.

375. E.g., Susan D. Carle, Theorizing Agency, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 307, 332 (2005) (noting
“the great emotional weight attached to the idea of free, autonomous individuals in Western liberal thought”).
376. Shapiro, supra note 16, at 530 (noting negative public reaction in Massachusetts
to mandatory seat belt laws, due to perceived paternalistic nature of the law).
377. Cf. Sunstein, supra note 49, at 1173 (“[T]he risks created by rejecting private
preferences are formidable, as the framers were well aware. Such a system raises the spectre of tyranny, as government attempts to change preferences in response to a perception
that the current structure is not autonomous.”).
378. Glaeser, supra note 9, at 150 (even “perfectly” chosen paternalistic policies involve
“deadweight” losses).
379. See supra notes 76-81.

